[Footnote 252:  In the general American argument before the Geneva Arbitration Court it was stated that the practical effect of British diplomacy in this connection was that “Great Britain was thus to gain the benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second and third articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protected and their devastation legalized, while the United States were to be deprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain.”  Cited in Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, IV, p. 280.]

[Footnote 253:  Henry Adams, Historical Essays, pp. 237-279.]

[Footnote 254:  Ibid., p. 271.]

[Footnote 255:  Ibid., p. 273.]

[Footnote 256:  Ibid., p. 277.]

[Footnote 257:  This same view was maintained, though without stating details, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907.  See his “Education of Henry Adams,” Private Edition, p. 128.]

[Footnote 258:  Bancroft, Seward, II, Ch. 31.]

[Footnote 259:  Cited by Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 189.]

[Footnote 260:  Ibid.]

[Footnote 261:  Ibid., p. 193.]

[Footnote 262:  Ibid.]

[Footnote 263:  Ibid.]

[Footnote 264:  U.S.  Messages and Documents, 1861-2, p. 1431 Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.]

[Footnote 265:  Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 196.  This speculation is not supported by any reference to documents revealing such a purpose.  While it may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne out by the new British materials cited later in this chapter.]

[Footnote 266:  C.F.  Adams, “Seward and The Declaration of Paris” Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings, XLVI, pp. 23-81.]

[Footnote 267:  Ibid., p. 57.  The quotation is from a despatch by Lyons of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language.  It is true that Seward had refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read and considered it in private.  Hence he knew privately the facts of Russell’s proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate.  The incident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I regard Seward’s refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily a refusal to be notified of Great Britain’s proclamation of neutrality.  Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward to be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation, thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 181.) I agree with C.F.  Adams that the only effect of this, so far as the negotiation is concerned was that “Seward, by what has always, for some reason not at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused a transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London and Paris.” ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris,” p. 50.)]

[Footnote 268:  Ibid., p. 51.]