The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris.  Lyons’ report of the misunderstanding and that new instructions were being sent to Adams was received on June 30.  Russell replied to Lyons on July 5 that Adams had “never made any proposition” on the Declaration of Paris, and that he would now await one[302].  July 11, Adams made his formal offer to sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth.  On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important step indicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulterior motive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with no resulting irritations or complications with the United States.  He recalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with the Confederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyons should act without first officially notifying Seward.  This recall was now made, he wrote, because to go on might “create fresh irritation without any adequate result,” but if in the meantime Lyons had already started negotiations with the South he might “proceed in them to the end[303].”

Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with the United States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure American adherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude the convention at once.  The warnings received from many sources did not dismay him.  He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue, believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering.  Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to have been ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 he telegraphed Cowley, “I conclude there can be no objection to my signing a Convention with the U.S.  Minister giving the adherence of the U.S. to the Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt.  Britain.  Answer immediately by telegraph[304].”  Cowley replied on the sixteenth that Thouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move[305].  Cowley in a private letter of the same day thought that unless there were “very cogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams,” it would be better to wait until France could be brought in, and he expressed again his fear of the danger involved in Adams’ proposal[306].  The same objection was promptly made by Palmerston when shown the draft of a reply to Adams.  Palmerston suggested the insertion of a statement that while ready to sign a convention Great Britain would do so only at the same time with France[307].  Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the late afternoon of the sixteenth to Cowley that he would “wait for your despatches to-morrow,” and that no reply had yet been given Adams[308], and on the seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, approved by Palmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire to act alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those of Adams.  He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might be informed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way alter the Proclamation of Neutrality[309].