Others were more suspicious.  Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward had specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signed would bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southern privateering[295].  The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was to impress upon them the advisability of an official notification to Seward, of English and French neutrality—­a step not yet taken and which was still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296].  On June 15 the two Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made that joint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as acting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he read these for his private information.  The remainder of June was spent by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet not pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward’s anger.  June 17, Lyons told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain must have some intercourse with the South if only for the protection of British interests.  Seward’s reply was that the United States might “shut its eyes” to this, but that if notified of what England and France were doing, the United States would be compelled to make protest.  Lyons thereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personal knowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning the negotiation with the Confederacy[297].  Yet while thus reporting this postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date, indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solution of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, the Confederacy.  The idea was Mercier’s.  Their consuls in the South were to be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to the Governor of the State selected, thus avoiding any overture to the Confederate Government[298].  Even with this solution possible they still hesitated, feeling as Lyons wrote “a little pusillanimous,” but believing they had prevented an explosion[299].  Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because of an important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal instructions and those of Mercier.  The latter had no orders, as had Lyons, to notify Seward, if the agreement on maritime law was made in Washington, that such agreement would not affect the belligerent right of the South to issue privateers[300].  Apparently Mercier had been given no instructions to make this clear—­let alone any “latitude” to deal with privateering—­although, as a matter of fact, he had already given Seward his personal opinion in accord with Lyons’ instructions; but this was not an official French stand.  Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the “misunderstanding” now cleared away, that new instructions were being sent to Adams to go on with the convention in London.  His only subsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, when he learned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been directed to raise no further question as to what would or would not be demanded of France in case a convention were signed for an American adherence to the Declaration of Paris.  Lyons now repeated his former advice that under no circumstances should a convention be signed without a distinct declaration of no British responsibility or duty as regards Southern privateers[301].