“I have further to state to you, with reference to my despatch of this day that H.M.  Govt. were in the first instance inclined to propose to both of the contending parties to adopt the first clause of the Declaration of Paris, by which privateering is renounced.  But after communication with the French Govt. it appeared best to limit our propositions in the manner explained in my despatch.

“I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M. Mercier is not absolutely instructed to advert to the abolition of privateering, yet that some latitude of action is left to him on that point should he deem it advisable to exercise it[288].”

Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in Seward’s mind.  Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited to use his own discretion as to joint action with the French Minister so long only as the two countries took the same stand.  He was to pursue whatever method seemed most “conciliatory.”  His first private comment on receiving Russell’s instruction was, “Mr. Seward will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the Declaration of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering[289],” and in an official confidential despatch of the same day, June 4, he gave Russell clear warning of what Seward expected from his overture through Adams[290].  So delicate did the matter appear to Lyons and Mercier that they agreed to keep quiet for a time at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by the transfer of the whole matter to London and Paris[291].  But in London Russell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose.  On June 6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) that he understood a communication had been made in Paris, as in London, for an American adherence to the Declaration of Paris; “... it may open the way to the abolition of Privateering all over the world.  But ... we ought not to use any menace to the Confederate States with a view of obtaining this desirable object[292].”  Evidently, in his opinion, the South would not dare to hold out and no “menace” would be required[293].  Six days later, however, having learned from the French Ambassador that Dayton in Paris had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United States that France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote that England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294].  Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection to concluding a convention with the United States.  Apparently he could not believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declared neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the American Secretary of State.