What did Russell mean by this cautious statement?  The facts known to him were that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of marque and that Lincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern privateering to be piracy[286].  He did not know that Seward was prepared to renounce privateering, but he must have thought it likely from Lincoln’s proclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to strike for an object desired by all the European maritime nations since 1856.  Russell could not, while Great Britain was neutral, join the United States in treating Southern privateers as pirates, but he here offered to come as close to it as he dared, by asserting that Great Britain would use vigilance in upholding the law of nations.  This language might be interpreted as intended for the admonition of the North also, but the facts of the then known situation make it applicable to Southern activities alone.  Russell had desired to include privateering in the proposals to the United States and to the South, but Thouvenel’s criticisms forced him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, and a full statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formal letter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions.  This was also dated May 18.  In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the British Consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official instruction “to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled Confederate States,” and he further explained his purpose and the British position: 

“...  You will not err in encouraging the Government to which you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in regard to privateering....

“You will clearly understand that Her Majesty’s Government cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of the Government of the United States if coupled with the condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent operations of vessels holding from them such letters of marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of the law of nations[287].”

Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British policy of neutrality.  Russell had guarded against the complication feared by Thouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the North and a half-threat to the South to secure from both belligerents a renunciation of privateering.  In short he was not yet fully convinced of the wisdom of the French limitation.  Moreover he believed that Thouvenel might yet be won to his own opinion, for in an unprinted portion of this same private letter to Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote: