in Adams’ conversation of the eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought.  The first was Adams’ protest against the British recognition of a status of belligerency.  If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it been wise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South?  This required consideration.  And in the second place did not Adams’ offer again open up the prospect of somehow getting from the North at least a formal and permanent renunciation of privateering?

For if an examination is made of Russell’s instruction to Lyons of May 18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that reference to privateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own instructions to Mercier.  Adams understood Russell to have said that he “had already transmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any modification of the only point in issue which the Government of the United States might prefer.  On that matter he believed that there would be no difficulty whatever[284].”  This clearly referred to privateering.  Russell’s instructions to Lyons took up the points of the Declaration of Paris in reverse order.  That on blockades was now generally accepted by all nations.  The principle of the third article had “long been recognized as law, both in Great Britain and in the United States.”  The second article, “sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period of the history of their independence,” had been opposed, formerly, by Great Britain, but having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, “she means to adhere to the principle she then adopted.”  Thus briefly stating his confidence that the United States would agree on three of the articles, Russell explained at length his views as to privateering in the American crisis.

“There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, that relating to privateering, from which the Government of the United States withheld their assent.  Under these circumstances it is expedient to consider what is required on this subject by the general law of nations.  Now it must be borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the most destructive and sanguinary outrages.  There can be no question, however, but that the commander and crew of a ship bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry on their hostilities according to the established laws of war.  Her Majesty’s Government must, therefore, hold any Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for, and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her Majesty’s subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of vessels sailing under such letters of marque.

     “In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a
     certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new
     principle.

     “You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward[285].”