Government would practically levy were exchange forced up to 1s. 4d., and obviously very much better than the twenty-one per cent. export tax which the Government evidently look forward to, for, as we have seen, it is aiming at a 1s. 6d. rate.  A large saving, too, might be effected by going back to the old system of having a local European force in India.  Let anyone consider these points, and weigh the remarkable and interesting statement quoted from Sir William Hunter, and he will at once see that the condition of India generally is full of hope (or at least was so till the monetary policy was announced), and that its taxational resources are by no means exhausted.  It should also be considered that as the Government has not only spent large sums in recent years in defensive works and public buildings, and at the same time paid off debt to the amount of twenty-three millions, it would be perfectly justified in borrowing, if it were necessary, in order to meet temporary difficulties.

Now let me turn to what is the dominant cause of the monetary policy of the Government—­the dread that if the Sherman Act were repealed exchange might sink even as low as a shilling per rupee.[70] What if it did?  Let us examine the consequences of that to India considered as a whole.  The apprehension in question was proclaimed in the Viceroy’s speech of June, 26th, 1893, and in considering the consequences of a 1s. rate of exchange, he pointed out that this would entail an increase of Rs. x 7,748,000 in the remittances required to be made for the home charges of the Government, being, curiously enough, almost the exact sum which the people of India would lose on their exports were exchange forced up to 1s. 4d. by the monetary policy of the Government.  But as the producers of India would gain largely by the 1s. rate of exchange, the total account would stand thus:—­loss to the Government say, for the sake of round figures, seven millions; gain to the producers, twenty-one millions; total gain to India, considered as a whole, fourteen millions.  So that if the very worst anticipations of the Government were realized India would be a large gainer by the fall to a 1s. rate of exchange, and the finances could be squared by increased taxation, which, if levied considerably on imports, would be distinctly a popular measure.  And, in any case, the agitators could have no ground to go upon, as I have shown, as the increased taxation could be amply justified.

One word more.  I cannot refrain from calling attention to the remarkable circumstance that Mr. Gladstone’s Government has in a single year adopted two measures which are highly objectionable from political, economical, and financial points of view—­the Home Rule Bill for Ireland and the Currency Measure for India; and that both were forced on by arbitrary and tyrannical action.  For just as the Home Rule Bill was forced through the House of Commons with inadequate examination and discussion, so was the