“Must we not, then, of necessity,” he continued, “speak thus of that which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish, when death approaches it.  For, from what has been said already, it will not admit death, nor will ever be dead; just as we said that three will never be even, nor, again, will the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor yet the heat that is in fire. 127.  But some one may say, what hinders, though the odd can never become even by the approach of the even, as we have allowed, yet, when the odd is destroyed, that the even should succeed in its place?  We could not contend with him who should make this objection that it is not destroyed, for the uneven is not imperishable; since, if this were granted us, we might easily have contended that, on the approach of the even, the odd and the three depart; and we might have contended in the same way with respect to fire, heat, and the rest, might we not?”

“Certainly.”

“Wherefore, with respect to the immortal, if we have allowed that it is imperishable, the soul, in addition to its being immortal, must also be imperishable; if not, there will be need of other arguments.”

“But there is no need,” he said, “so far as that is concerned; for scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption, if that which is immortal and eternal is liable to it.”

128.  “The deity, indeed, I think,” said Socrates, “and the idea itself of life, and if anything else is immortal, must be allowed by all beings to be incapable of dissolution.”

“By Jupiter!” he replied, “by all men, indeed, and still more, as I think, by the gods.”

“Since, then, that which is immortal is also incorruptible, can the soul, since it is immortal, be any thing else than imperishable?”

“It must, of necessity, be so.”

“When, therefore, death approaches a man, the mortal part of him, as it appears, dies, but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted, having withdrawn itself from death?”

“It appears so.”

“The soul, therefore,” he said, “Cebes, is most certainly immortal and imperishable, and our souls will really exist in Hades.”

“Therefore, Socrates,” he said, “I have nothing further to say against this, nor any reason for doubting your arguments.  But if Simmias here, or any one else, has any thing to say, it were well for him not to be silent; for I know not to what other opportunity beyond the present any one can defer it, who wishes either to speak or hear about these things.”

“But, indeed,” said Simmias, “neither have I any reason to doubt what has been urged; yet, from the magnitude of the subject discussed, and from my low opinion of human weakness, I am compelled still to retain a doubt within myself with respect to what has been said.”

“Not only so, Simmias,” said Socrates, “but you say this well; and, moreover, the first hypotheses, even though they are credible to you, should nevertheless be examined more carefully; and if you should investigate them sufficiently, I think you will follow my reasoning as far as it is possible for man to do so; and if this very point becomes clear, you will inquire no further.”