125. “Perfectly so,” he replied.
“Answer me, then,” he said, “what that is which, when it is in the body, the body will be alive?”
“Soul,” he replied.
“Is not this, then, always the case?”
“How should it not be?” said he.
“Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?”
“It does indeed,” he replied.
“Whether, then, is there any thing contrary to life or not?”
“There is,” he replied.
“What?”
“Death.”
“The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it, as has been already allowed?”
“Most assuredly,” replied Cebes.
“What, then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of the even?”
“Uneven,” he replied.
“And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?”
“Unmusical,” he said, “and unjust.”
“Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?”
“Immortal,” he replied.
“Therefore, does not the soul admit death?”
“No.”
“Is the soul, then, immortal?”
“Immortal.”
126. “Be it so,” he said. “Shall we say, then, that this has been now demonstrated? or how think you?”
“Most completely, Socrates.”
“What, then,” said he, “Cebes, if it were necessary for the uneven to be imperishable, would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?”
“How should it not?”
“If, therefore, it were also necessary that what is without heat should be imperishable, when any one should introduce heat to snow, would not the snow withdraw itself, safe and unmelted? For it would not perish; nor yet would it stay and admit the heat.”
“You say truly,” he replied.
“In like manner, I think, if that which is insusceptible of cold were imperishable, that when any thing cold approached the fire, it would neither be extinguished nor perish, but would depart quite safe.”
“Of necessity,” he said.