61.  “Greece is wide, Cebes,” he replied, “and in it surely there are skillful men.  There are also many barbarous nations, all of which you should search through, seeking such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, as there is nothing on which you can more seasonably spend your money.  You should also seek for him among yourselves; for perhaps you could not easily find any more competent than yourselves to do this.”

“This shall be done,” said Cebes; “but, if it is agreeable to you, let us return to the point from whence we digressed.”

“It will be agreeable to me, for how should it not?”

“You say well,” rejoined Cebes.

“We ought, then,” said Socrates, “to ask ourselves some such question as this:  to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus affected—­namely, to be dispersed—­and for what we ought to fear, lest it should be so affected, and for what not.  And after this we should consider which of the two the soul is, and in the result should either be confident or fearful for our soul.”

“You speak truly,” said he.

62.  “Does it not, then, appertain to that which is formed by composition, and is naturally compounded, to be thus affected, to be dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded; and if there is any thing not compounded, does it not appertain to this alone, if to any thing, not to be thus affected?”

“It appears to me to be so,” said Cebes.

“Is it not most probable, then, that things which are always the same, and in the same state, are uncompounded, but that things which are constantly changing, and are never in the same state, are compounded?”

“To me it appears so.”

“Let us return, then,” he said, “to the subjects on which we before discoursed.  Whether is essence itself, of which we gave this account that it exists, both in our questions and answers, always the same, or does it sometimes change?  Does equality itself, the beautiful itself, and each several thing which is, ever undergo any change, however small?  Or does each of them which exists, being an unmixed essence by itself, continue always the same, and in the same state, and never undergo any variation at all under any circumstances?”

“They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state, Socrates,” said Cebes.

63.  “But what shall we say of the many beautiful things, such as men, horses, garments, or other things of the kind, whether equal or beautiful, or of all things synonymous with them?  Do they continue the same, or, quite contrary to the former, are they never at any time, so to say, the same, either with respect to themselves or one another?”

“These, on the other hand,” replied Cebes, “never continue the same.”

“These, then, you can touch, or see, or perceive by the other senses; but those that continue the same, you can not apprehend in any other way than by the exercise of thought; for such things are invisible, and are not seen?”