17.  “This, indeed,” said Cebes, “appears to be probable.  But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very willing to die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just now is agreeable to reason—­that it is God who takes care of us, and that we are his property.  For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that service in which they govern them who are the best of all masters—­namely, the gods—­is not consistent with reason; for surely he can not think that he will take better care of himself when he has become free.  But a foolish man might perhaps think thus, that he should fly from his master, and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from a good one, but should cling to him as much as possible; therefore he would fly against all reason; but a man of sense would desire to be constantly with one better than himself.  Thus, Socrates, the contrary of what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to rejoice.”

18.  Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to be pleased with the pertinacity of Cebes, and, looking toward us, said, “Cebes, you see, always searches out arguments, and is not at all willing to admit at once any thing one has said.”

Whereupon Simmias replied, “But, indeed, Socrates, Cebes appears to me now to say something to the purpose; for with what design should men really wise fly from masters who are better than themselves, and so readily leave them?  And Cebes appears to me to direct his argument against you, because you so easily endure to abandon both us and those good rulers, as you yourself confess, the gods.”

“You speak justly,” said Socrates, “for I think you mean that I ought to make my defense to this charge, as if I were in a court of justice.”

“Certainly,” replied Simmias.

19.  “Come, then,” said he, “I will endeavor to defend myself more successfully before you than before the judges.  For,” he proceeded, “Simmias and Cebes, if I did not think that I should go, first of all, among other deities who are both wise and good, and, next, among men who have departed this life, better than any here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death; but now, be assured, I hope to go among good men, though I would not positively assert it.  That, however, I shall go among gods who are perfectly good masters, be assured I can positively assert this, if I can any thing of the kind.  So that, on this account, I am not so much troubled, but I entertain a good hope that something awaits those who die, and that, as was said long since, it will be far better for the good than the evil.”

20.  “What, then, Socrates,” said Simmias, “would you go away keeping this persuasion to yourself, or would you impart it to us?  For this good appears to me to be also common to us; and at the same time it will be an apology for you, if you can persuade us to believe what you say.”