Mel. No, by Jupiter, none whatever.

Socr. You say what is incredible, Melitus, and that, as appears to me, even to yourself.  For this man, O Athenians! appears to me to be very insolent and intemperate and to have preferred this indictment through downright insolence, intemperance, and wantonness.  For he seems, as it were, to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an experiment.  Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting, and contradict myself, or shall I deceive him and all who hear me?  For, in my opinion, he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment, as if he should say, Socrates is guilty of wrong in not believing that there are gods, and in believing that there are gods.  And this, surely, is the act of one who is trifling.

15.  Consider with me now, Athenians, in what respect he appears to me to say so.  And do you, Melitus, answer me; and do ye, as I besought you at the outset, remember not to make an uproar if I speak after my usual manner.

Is there any man, Melitus, who believes that there are human affairs, but does not believe that there are men?  Let him answer, judges, and not make so much noise.  Is there any one who does not believe that there are horses, but that there are things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that there are pipers, but that there are things pertaining to pipes?  There is not, O best of men! for since you are not willing to answer, I say it to you and to all here present.  But answer to this at least:  is there any one who believes that there are things relating to demons, but does not believe that there are demons?

Mel. There is not.

Socr. How obliging you are in having hardly answered; though compelled by these judges!  You assert, then, that I do believe and teach things relating to demons, whether they be new or old; therefore, according to your admission, I do believe in things relating to demons, and this you have sworn in the bill of indictment.  If, then, I believe in things relating to demons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I should believe that there are demons.  Is it not so?  It is.  For I suppose you to assent, since you do not answer.  But with respect to demons, do we not allow that they are gods, or the children of gods?  Do you admit this or not?

Mel. Certainly.

Socr. Since, then, I allow that there are demons, as you admit, if demons are a kind of gods, this is the point in which I say you speak enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there are gods, and again that I do allow there are, since I allow that there are demons?  But if demons are the children of gods, spurious ones, either from nymphs or any others, of whom they are reported to be, what man can think that there are sons of gods, and yet that there are not gods?  For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that there are mules, the offspring of horses and asses,