Around him the Reis, or captains of the Moslem galleys, clamorously demanded that he should take precautions against a land-attack.  It was true that the raid which had been made by Grimani had been easily repulsed, but in present circumstances there was no question of a mere raid, as, should the Christian admiral so decide, he could land twenty thousand men.  Sinan Reis, an old Osmanli warrior, furious with jealousy that the chief command should be in the hands of a corsair, sustained his opinion in a manner which augured ill for the hearty co-operation of all the Turkish forces.  Sinan was just one of those blindly valiant fighters from whom the politic Ibrahim had desired to deliver his master when he had urged the appointment of Kheyr-ed-Din:  brave as a lion, keen as the edge of his own good scimitar, fanatical, as became a Hodja who had visited the Holy Places, Sinan was a type of the Turkish sea-officer:  devoid of strategical instinct and tactical training, his one idea was a headlong attack, then victory or the houris of Paradise.  It will be seen that Barbarossa had not only Doria and the Christian fleet and army against which to contend on this occasion.

The peril conjured up by Sinan Reis on this occasion was not altogether an imaginary one:  the idea of a disembarkation had, in point of fact, been seriously discussed that very morning by Andrea Doria and his council of war, at which Hernando de Gonzaga, Generalissimo of the troops embarked, had advised a landing.  His argument, embodied in a long and technical harangue, may be reduced to the following: 

If we cannot go straight at the enemy and force our way through the entrance under his cannon why should we not reduce the fortress of Prevesa by a siege?  Once masters of this height, we could close the strait by sinking in it vessels laden with stones, and we then have the Ottoman fleet at our mercy.

But Doria the sailor was not to be led by Gonzaga the soldier.  He said: 

The advice seems sound, but in reality it would prove most dangerous if followed.  Barbarossa must have landed some of his men, the cavalry which defeated Grimani’s raid will no doubt come again from the interior, if necessary.  If we deprive our ships of their soldiers we expose ourselves to a sea-fight under most disadvantageous conditions.  But most, important of all is the fact that time presses; the season is far advanced; at any time the fleet may be driven off these shores by a storm, in which case what would become of the troops left on shore?  Again, if it comes on to blow a tempest from the westward we may lose not only our troops, but our ships, in fact the whole expedition.

At the battle of Actium, Octavius occupied the shore upon which Hernando Gonzaga wished to land and assault; but notwithstanding this fact Octavius did not attempt the passage of the gulf but waited for his enemy outside.  Doria was therefore all the more justified in not sacrificing ships and men in attempting to force an entrance now that this same shore was in the hands of the enemy.  He was asked, he said, to thrust his head into the mouth of the wolf, and this he was determined not to do.