the language of his answer, Kentucky acquiesced in his declining to furnish the troops called for, and she did so not because she loved the Union less but she feared that if she had parted with those troops and sent them to serve in your ranks, she would have been overwhelmed by secessionists at home, and severed from the Union.  And it was to preserve substantially and ultimately our connection with the Union that induced us to acquiesce in the partial infraction of it by our Governor’s refusal of the troops required.  This was the most prevailing and general motive.  To this may be added the strong indisposition of our people to a civil war with the South, and the apprehended consequences of a civil war within our state and among our people....  I think Kentucky’s excuse a good one and that under all the circumstances of a complicated case she is rendering better service in her present position than she could by becoming an active party in the contest."[34]

The fact is that secession had little chance in Kentucky after public opinion found expression.  Neutrality early became the order of the day.  The elections of 1861 were significant in that they gave the people a chance to express their will.  It should be borne in mind that the legislature of 1859 was elected when the question of union or disunion was not before the people.  Now in 1861 they had to elect members to the Border State Convention, a new legislature, and congressmen to represent Kentucky at the special session called by President Lincoln.  In all these elections, Unionists won.  Some historians like Smith and Shaler[35] seem to think that the State had pledged itself to remain unconditionally neutral, that these elections had no particular bearing on the situation and that if a “sovereignty convention” had been called, secession would have won.  These writers do not seem to see that the people of Kentucky, although nominally neutral, desired to remain with the Union.  Doubtless a better statement is that, although the election of 1861 showed that a large majority of the people were in favor of the Union, the Union leaders did not show so in the early part of the year and neutrality was adopted not as an end but as a means that triumph over the enemies of the Union might finally be assured.[36] We easily see now that there was not much danger of secession, but the Unionists could not see it so well at that time.  Smith and Shaler doubtless exaggerate the situation, for what danger of secession could there have been when the people had elected the Union candidates for the Border State Convention to be convened at Frankfort on May 27, when they sent nine Unionists out of the ten congressmen to represent them in the special session of Congress, and when on the 5th of the following August, after the battle of Bull Run, they elected to the State Legislature 103 Unionists out of 141 members.[37] The calling of a convention then would have made little difference, if the people had chosen