The Journal of Negro History, Volume 1, January 1916 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 615 pages of information about The Journal of Negro History, Volume 1, January 1916.

The Journal of Negro History, Volume 1, January 1916 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 615 pages of information about The Journal of Negro History, Volume 1, January 1916.
with the South, but if at any time thereafter the President’s proclamation should assume the aspect of war, it would do so.  They evidently did not believe that it had or would assume such an aspect.  They were also trying to pacify those who misunderstood the issues of “subjugation” and “coercion."[30] The relation of the States to the Union was yet a problem to many a statesman.  Many thought that the colonists when in a state of nature came together and agreed to a compact, giving up some of their sovereignty and retaining the other, and, therefore, had the right to withdraw at pleasure, carrying a part of the national property with them.  Such thinkers contended too that the Union had no right to “coerce” a seceded State.  Calhoun had said that because the Union was a compact it could be broken; on the other hand, Jackson had said that because it was a compact it could not be broken.  Now it was difficult for Kentuckians to decide who was right.  That the committee had no intention of going with the Confederacy may be seen from the following declaration:  “Seditious leaders in the midst of us now appeal to her (Kentucky) to furnish troops to uphold those combinations against the government of the Union.  Will she comply with this appeal?  Ought she to comply with it?  We answer, no."[31]

While these things were going on, the great question of Fort Sumter was before the people.  When the fort was finally bombarded and Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand troops Gov.  Magoffin politely refused to comply.  His reply was:  “I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."[32] He had already been much moved by the large vote given the delegates to the Border States Convention, indicating such a growth of Union sentiment that he called the legislature together, hoping to win the day for secession by changing the policy of the State from mediatorial to armed neutrality, resisting all forces, whether Confederate or Federal, which might bring war into the State.  The body met on the sixteenth of May, passed a resolution of mediatorial neutrality and approved the Governor’s refusal to furnish troops under the existing circumstances.[33] This, however, did not mean that the legislature was in sympathy with the efforts of the Governor to support the Southern cause.  Writing to Gen. Scott, John J. Crittenden explained it thus: 

“The position of Kentucky and the relation she occupies toward the government of the Union is not, I fear, understood at Washington.  It ought to be well understood.  Very important consequences may depend upon it and upon her proper treatment.  Unfortunately for us our Governor does not sympathize with Kentucky in respect to secession.  His opinions and feelings incline him strongly to the side of the South.  His answer to the requisition for troops was in terms hasty and unbecoming and does not correspond with the usual and gentlemanly courtesy.  But while she regretted
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The Journal of Negro History, Volume 1, January 1916 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.