miss it in the end, if not by a great deal, just a little.  With everything depending on New York,” he continued, “it would be a mistake to nominate me.  This is not new to me—­I have weighed all the chances.  Besides”—­and here he kindled—­“why should we let the country go into the hands of Democrats when we can name a ticket that is certain to be elected—­one that would sweep every Northern State?”

“What is it?” I asked.

The answer came with vivid animation:  “William T. Sherman and Robert T. Lincoln.”  This idea was instantly amplified.  “The names of Sherman and Lincoln put together would be irresistible.  That ticket would elect itself.  We should have a campaign of marching and song.  We need the inspiration, and ‘Marching Through Georgia’ and ’We Are Coming, Father Abraham,’ would give it.  We must not lose this campaign, and I am alarmed by the prospect of losing it in my name.”

“But,” I interposed, “it is the report and the public opinion that General Sherman would not consent to be a candidate; that he would throw the party down that would nominate him.  Why not try the other Sherman?”

Mr. Blaine’s response was that John Sherman would have the like difficulty in carrying New York that he would have himself.  The element of military heroism was wanting.  He had written to General Sherman on the subject, and of course the General thought he could not consent to be President—­for that was what it amounted to—­but his reasoning was fallacious.  If General Sherman had the question put to him—­whether to be President himself or turn the office over to the Democratic party, with the Solid South dominant—­he would see his duty and do it, though his reluctance was real.

I said General Sherman could not consent to appear in competition with his brother John at Chicago, though he had a funny way of looking on John in West Point style as a “politician,” and that was an insuperable difficulty; and that, Mr. Blaine did not seem to have thought of as a serious element in the case, but he realized the force of it.  I was anxious to hear more about the correspondence between Blaine and General Sherman; but was only told that the letter to the General was a call to consider that circumstances might arise, and should do so, in which the General’s sense of duty could be appealed to, and be as strong as that to take up arms had been when the Union demanded defenders.

[Illustration:  MR. BLAINE AT HIS DESK IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

From a photograph by Miss F.B.  Johnston.]

Arrived at Chicago, I soon ascertained that Mr. Blaine had been doing a good deal of talking of the same kind I had heard, but he had not been able to impress the more robust of those favorable to his nomination with the view that he should be heeded.  They insisted that he was not wise, but timid; that he did not like war and would do too much for peace; that he especially miscalculated when he said he could not carry New