morning.”  The matter is simple enough:  she should have entrusted the security of her western frontier to the public opinion of the west of Europe and to America, and fought Russia, if attacked, with her rear not otherwise defended.  The Militarist theory is that we, France and England, would have immediately sprung at her from behind; but that is just how the Militarist theory gets its votaries into trouble by assuming that Europe is a chess board.  Europe is not a chess board; but a populous continent in which only a very few people are engaged in military chess; and even those few have many other things to consider besides capturing their adversary’s king.  Not only would it have been impossible for England to have attacked Germany under such circumstances; but if France had done so England could not have assisted her, and might even have been compelled by public opinion to intervene by way of a joint protest from England and America, or even by arms, on her behalf if she were murderously pressed on both flanks.  Even our Militarists and diplomatists would have had reasons for such an intervention.  An aggressive Franco-Russian hegemony, if it crushed Germany, would be quite as disagreeable to us as a German one.  Thus Germany would at worst have been fighting Russia and France with the sympathy of all the other Powers, and a chance of active assistance from some of them, especially those who share her hostility to the Russian Government.  Had France not attacked her—­and though I am as ignorant of the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance as Sir Edward Grey is strangely content to be, I cannot see how the French Government could have justified to its own people a fearfully dangerous attack on Germany had Russia been the aggressor—­Germany would have secured fair play for her fight with Russia.  But even the fight with Russia was not inevitable.  The ultimatum to Servia was the escapade of a dotard:  a worse crime than the assassination that provoked it.  There is no reason to doubt the conclusion in Sir Maurice de Bunsen’s despatch (No. 161) that it could have been got over, and that Russia and Austria would have thought better of fighting and come to terms.  Peace was really on the cards; and the sane game was to play for it.

The Achilles Heel of Militarism.

Instead, Germany flew at France’s throat, and by incidentally invading Belgium gave us the excuse our Militarists wanted to attack her with the full sympathy of the nation.  Why did she do this stupid thing?  Not because of the counsels of General von Bernhardi.  On the contrary, he had warned her expressly against allowing herself to be caught between Russia and a Franco-British combination until she had formed a counterbalancing alliance with America, Italy, and Turkey.  And he had most certainly not encouraged her to depend on England sparing her:  on the contrary, he could not sufficiently admire the wily ruthlessness with which England watches her opportunity and springs at her foe when the foe is