The misunderstanding about the Peace Conference is easily put right.  Sir Edward Grey did not propose any peace conference at all, but a conference of the Ambassadors of those four powers which were at that time not directly concerned, namely Germany, England, France, and Italy.  These powers were to attempt to exert their influence on Austria-Hungary and Russia in the same way as the Ambassador’s Conference (or rather Ambassadorial Reunion) in London had done, in 1912 and 1913, on the Balkan States and Turkey.  What the united six powers at that time undertook toward the Balkan States was now to be done by four—­discordant—­powers upon two others who are in a state of highest political tension.  To this proposal Germany replied that the apparatus of an Ambassadorial Conference does not work quickly or effectually enough for the emergency of the moment, or to be able to ease the tense political situation.

The Kaiser’s Efforts.

In place of this, however, the German Emperor undertook to negotiate in person with the Russian and Austrian monarch and was overwhelmed with grief when the leaders of Muscovite policy frustrated all his exertions by completely ignoring his efforts for peace, (made at the express desire of the Czar,) and then in real earnest amassing Russian forces on the German frontier, evidently resolved to force on a war under any circumstances—­even against the will of the Czar.

It is here that the clue to all the terrible events of the present day is to be found.

The incessant intriguing of the Russian military party for many years past has at last succeeded in drawing first France and then England to their cause, by turning the mistrust, the dread of competition, the hopes of revenge, and the ever-increasing armaments to their use with incomparable skill.  The task was facilitated by Germany’s industrial up-growth, which—­in willful misconstruction of the truths of the laws of international communities—­has been represented as a calamity for other States.

England’s Growing Friendship.

In quite recent times people in England began to recognize this misconstruction of facts as such.  They began to understand that friendship with Germany might be a blessing and that in this way peace would be possible.  This, however, meant the possibility of the Muscovite policy being completely frustrated.  An Anglo-German understanding seemed already to be shaking the very foundations of the Triple Entente.  Russia had been obliged during the two Balkan wars (the London Ambassadorial Conference was in fact the clearing house for this) to make important concessions to the detriment of her proteges, Servia and Montenegro, in order to retain the friendship of England, which ardently strove for peace.  Now, however, it was highest time for Russia to pocket her gains; for the English people were slowly beginning to realize that in St. Petersburg they were trying to engage England in the cause of Pan-Slavism.  The unnatural alliance was becoming more and more unpopular from day to day.  How long would it be before Russia lost England’s help forever?