They will then see that, from the issue of the Austrian note to Servia onward, Great Britain, whom they accuse of causing this war, strove incessantly for peace, Her successive proposals were supported by France, Russia, and Italy, but, unfortunately, not by the one power which could by a single word at Vienna have made peace certain.  Germany, in her own official defense—­incomplete as that document is—­does not pretend that she strove for peace; she only strove for “the localization of the conflict.”  She claimed that Austria should be left free to “chastise” Servia in whatever way she chose.  At most she proposed that Austria should not annex a portion of Servian territory—­a futile provision, since the execution of Austria’s demand would have made the whole of Servia subject to her will.

Great Britain, like the rest of Europe, recognized that, whatever just grounds of complaint Austria may have had, the unprecedented terms of her note to Servia constituted a challenge to Russia and a provocation to war.  The Austrian Emperor in his proclamation admitted that war was likely to ensue.  The German “White Book” states in so many words:  “We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field and therefore involve us in war. * * * We could not, however, * * * advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity.”  The German Government admits having known the tenor of the Austrian note beforehand, when it was concealed from all the other powers; admits backing it up after it was issued; admits that it knew the note was likely to precipitate war; and admits that, whatever professions it made to the other powers, in private it did not advise Austria to abate one jot of her demands.  This, to our minds, is tantamount to admitting that Germany has, together with her unfortunate ally, deliberately provoked the present war.

One point we freely admit.  Germany would very likely have preferred not to fight Great Britain at this moment.  She would have preferred to weaken and humiliate Russia; to make Servia a dependent of Austria; to render France innocuous and Belgium subservient; and then, having established an overwhelming advantage, to settle accounts with Great Britain.  Her grievance against us is that we did not allow her to do this.

Britain’s Love of Peace.

So deeply rooted is Great Britain’s love of peace, so influential among us are those who have labored through many difficult years to promote good feeling between this country and Germany, that, in spite of our ties of friendship with France, in spite of the manifest danger threatening ourselves, there was still, up to the last moment, a strong desire to preserve British neutrality, if it could be preserved without dishonor.  But Germany herself made this impossible.