New York Times, Current History, Vol 1, Issue 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 473 pages of information about New York Times, Current History, Vol 1, Issue 1.

New York Times, Current History, Vol 1, Issue 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 473 pages of information about New York Times, Current History, Vol 1, Issue 1.

The Blame Not England’s.

I have tried to show that we are in no way to blame for the hostility which has grown up between us.  So far as it had any solid cause at all it has arisen from fixed factors, which could no more be changed by us than the geographical position which has laid us right across their exit to the oceans of the world.  That this deeply rooted national sentiment, which forever regarded us as the Carthage to which they were destined to play the part of Rome, would, sooner or later, have brought about war between us, is, in my opinion, beyond all doubt.  But it was planned to come at the moment which was least favorable for Britain.  “Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us to the real situation,” says Bernhardi.  “We may, at most, use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.”  A more shameless sentence was never penned, and one stands marveling which is the more grotesque—­the cynicism of the sentiment or the folly which gave such a warning to the victim.  For be it remembered that Bernhardi’s words are to be taken very seriously, for they are not the ravings of some Pan-German monomaniac, but the considered views of the foremost military writer of Germany, one who is in touch with those inner circles whose opinions are the springs of national policy.  “Our last and greatest reckoning is to be with Great Britain,” said the bitter Treitschke.  Sooner or later the shock was to come.  Germany sat brooding over the chessboard of the world waiting for the opening which should assure a winning game.

* * * * *

It was clear that she should take her enemies separately rather than together.  If Britain were attacked it was almost certain that France and Russia would stand by her side.  But if, on the contrary, the quarrel could be made with these two powers, and especially with Russia, in the first instance, then it was by no means so certain that Great Britain would be drawn into the struggle.  Public opinion has to be strongly moved before our country can fight, and public opinion under a Liberal Government might well be divided upon the subject of Russia.  Therefore, if the quarrel could be so arranged as to seem to be entirely one between Teuton and Slav there was a good chance that Britain would remain undecided until the swift German sword had done its work.  Then, with the grim acquiescence of our deserted allies, the still bloody sword would be turned upon ourselves, and that great final reckoning would have come.

* * * * *

Such was the plan, and fortune favored it.  A brutal murder had, not for the first time, put Servia into a position where a State may be blamed for the sins of individuals.  An ultimatum was launched so phrased that it was impossible for any State to accept it as it stood and yet remain an independent State.  At the first sign of argument or remonstrance the Austrian Army marched upon Belgrade.  Russia, which had been already humiliated in 1908 by the forcible annexation of Bosnia, could not possibly submit a second time to the Caudine Forks.  She laid her hand upon her sword hilt.  Germany sprang to the side of her ally.  France ranged herself with Russia.  Like a thunderclap the war of the nations had begun.

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New York Times, Current History, Vol 1, Issue 1 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.