So much for the Belgium question and the sanction of international pledges.  The other question affecting the whole of Europe is the hope of a universal limitation of armaments.  But there is a particular question, touching France, which in practice would come before that.  I mean Alsace-Lorraine.  Unless Germany conquers Europe, Alsace-Lorraine should be restored to France.  A profound national sentiment, to which all conceivable considerations of expediency or ultimate advantage are unimportant, demands imperatively the return of the plunder.  And in the councils of the Allies, either alone or with German representatives, the attitude of French diplomacy would be:  “Is it clear about Alsace-Lorraine?  If so, we may proceed.  If not, it’s no use going any further.”

Question of Armaments.

We now come to armaments.  I have seen it suggested that the destruction of Essen, Wilhelmshaven, and Heligoland ought to be a condition of peace with Germany.  Certainly the disappearance of these phenomena would be a gain to the world.  So would the disappearance of Rosyth and Toulon.  It seems to me, however, very improbable that their destruction or dismantling by international command would occur after hostilities have ceased, or could usefully so occur.  If the French Army on its way to Berlin can treat the Krupp factory as the German Army on its way to Paris treated Rheims Cathedral, well and good!  In fact, most excellent!  And if the British Navy can somehow emasculate Wilhelmshaven and Heligoland I shall not complain that its behavior has been purely doctrinaire.  But otherwise I see nothing practical in the Essen-Wilhelmshaven-Heligoland suggestion.  Nor in the project for dethroning the Kaiser and sending him and his eldest son to settle their differences in St. Helena!  The Kaiser—­happily—­is not a Napoleon, nor has he yet himself accomplished anything big enough or base enough to merit Napoleon’s fate.  Any dethroning that may enliven the gray monotony of the post-bellum era at Potsdam should and will be done by the German soldiers themselves.  Even in international politics it is futile to try to meddle in other people’s private affairs.

Disarmament in Germany can be achieved by the exercise of one principle, and one principle only.  That principle is the principle of mutuality.  A scheme in which every nation will proportionately share should be presented to Germany, and she should be respectfully but quite firmly asked to participate in it.  There would be no sense in saying to Germany:  “You must disarm.”  The magic words would be:  “We are going to disarm, and so are you, whether you want to or not.”  As to the procedure of disarmament—­whether it shall be slow or fast, whether it shall include destruction or be content with mere omission to renew, how the proportions shall be decided, who shall give the signal to begin—­here are matters which I am without skill or desire to discuss.  All I know about them is that they are horribly complicated, unprecedentedly difficult, and bursting with danger; and that they will strain the wisdom, patience, and ingenuity of the negotiators to the very utmost.