Civil knowledge has three parts—­conversation, negotiation, and government—­since man seeks in society comfort, use, and protection.  The first of these is well laboured, the second and third are deficient.  Thus we conclude human philosophy, and turn to the sacred and inspired divinity, the port of all men’s labours and peregrinations.

Sacred theology, or divinity, is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of Nature.  Herein there has not been sufficiently inquired the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things.  Exposition of Scriptures, on the other hand, is not deficient.  Divinity has four main branches—­faith, manners, liturgy, and government—­in which I can find no ground vacant and unsown, so diligent have men been, either in sowing of seed or tares.

* * * * *

GEORGE BERKELEY

PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

George Berkeley, the metaphysician, was born on March 12, 1685, near Thomastown, Kilkenny, the son of a collector of revenue.  He entered Trinity College, Dublin, at the age of fifteen, and was admitted Fellow in 1707.  In that year he published two mathematical essays; two years later, his “Theory of Vision,” and in 1710 his “Principles of Human Knowledge.”  In 1713, in London, where he had published further philosophical papers, he formed the acquaintance of Steele, Swift, and Pope.  After travels in Europe he became chaplain to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland in 1721, and a few years after emigrated to Newport, Rhode Island, with a view to the establishment of a college in Bermuda for the education of Indians.  This scheme fell through, because of the failure of the promised government support.  Berkeley returned to London, and in 1734, by desire of Queen Caroline, was consecrated Bishop of Cloyne, in Ireland.  Here he lived until 1752, but spent his last months in retirement at Oxford, where he died on January 14, 1753.  Berkeley’s “Principles of Human Knowledge” is one of the most eminent of that sequence of metaphysical systems which, beginning with Descartes, constitutes what is known as modern philosophy.

I.—­THE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION

It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.  By sight, touch, and other senses, I receive various sensations; and any group of sensations, frequently accompanying one another, come to be known as one thing.  Thus a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence, having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing—­for instance, an apple.