The dissolution of friendship is warranted when one party has become depraved, since he has changed from being the person who was the object of friendship.  But he should not be given up while there is hope of restoring his character.  Again, if one develops a great superiority, friendship proper cannot persist—­at least, in its first form.  Our relations with a friend are much like those with our own selves; the true friend is a sort of alter ego.  Friendship is not to be identified with goodwill, though the latter is a condition precedent; we may feel goodwill, but not friendship, towards a person we have never seen or spoken to.  Unanimity of feeling—­not as to facts, but as to ends and means—­is a sort of equivalent to friendship in the body politic.  The reason why conferring a benefit creates more affection than receiving it seems to be that the benefactor feels himself the maker of the other; we all incline to love what we produced—­as parents their children, or the artist his own creations.

Self-love is wrong in a sense—­the usual sense in which the term is used, of giving priority to oneself in the acquisition of material pleasures.  But the seeking of the noblest things for oneself is really self-love, and may involve giving others, especially friends, the priority in respect of desirable things—­even to resigning to another the opportunity of doing a noble deed.  In this higher sense, self-love is praiseworthy.

The good man is self-sufficing, but friends are desirable, if not actually necessary to him, as giving scope for the exercise of beneficent activities, not as conferring benefits upon him.  Besides, man’s highest activities must be exercised not in isolation, but as a member of society, and such life lacks completeness if without friends.  Finally, friendship attains its completest realisation where comradeship is complete; that is to say, in a common life.

VI.—­CONCLUSION

We must revert once more to the question of Pleasure and Pain.  To say that pleasure is not good is absurd; he who does so stultifies himself by his own acts.  Eudoxus thought it was the good, his opinion being the weightier because of his temperateness.

It is desired for its own sake; its opposite is admittedly undesirable.  But since it may be added to other good things, it cannot be the good:  though to say that what every one desires is not good at all is folly.  That it is not “a quality,” or that it is “indeterminate,” are irrelevant arguments, both statements applying to what are admittedly among “goods.”  The doctrine that it is a process, again, will not hold water.  Pleasure is a thing complete; whereas a process is complete at no moment unless it be that of its termination.  It is the completion of its appropriate activity; not in the sense that a habit makes the activity complete, but as its accompaniment and complement.  Continuous it is not, just as the activity is not.  It is not the complete life, but is inseparable from it.  Pleasures, however, differ specifically and in value, as do the qualities with whose activities they are associated.  The pleasures proper to men are those associated with the activities proper to man as man, those shared with other animals being so only in a less degree.