The Carthaginians were equally unfortunate in their second maritime enterprise against Lilibaeum, for the Syracusans and Romans, having learnt their intention, anchored before the mouth of the harbour.  The Carthaginians, finding that they could not, as they expected, surprise the place, drew up their fleet in line of battle, a little way out at sea:  the allies immediately got under weigh; a battle ensued, in which the Carthaginians were defeated, with the loss of seven ships.  These successes, however, were dreadfully counterbalanced by the advance of Hannibal into Italy, and the decisive victories which he obtained in the very heart of the Roman territories.  Under these circumstances, maritime affairs were naturally disregarded.

Of the actual state of the Roman commerce about this time we know very little, but that it was lucrative, may fairly be inferred from the following circumstance:—­A little before the commencement of the second Punic war, Caius Flaminnus was extremely desirous to obtain the support and good will of the populace; with this object in view, he joined the tribunes of the people in passing a law, which is called the Flaminian, or Claudian law.  By it, the senators, who had been accustomed to acquire considerable wealth by fitting out ships and trading, were expressly forbidden to possess or hire any vessel above the burden of 300 amphorae or eight tons, and not more than one vessel even of that small tonnage.  This vessel was allowed them, and was deemed sufficient to bring the produce of their farms to Rome.  By the same law, the scribes, and the clerks, and attendants of the quaestors, were prohibited from trading; and thus the liberty of commerce was exclusively confined to the plebeians.

Whilst Hannibal threatened the Romans in the vicinity of Rome itself, they had neither leisure, inclination, or means, to cope with the Carthaginians by sea; at length, however, Marcellus, having checked the enemy in Italy, maritime affairs were again attended to.  Scipio, who had been successful in Spain, resolved to attempt the reduction of New Carthage:  this place was situated, like Old Carthage, on a peninsula betwixt a port and a lake:  its harbour was extremely commodious, and large enough to receive and shelter any fleet.  As it was the capital of the Carthaginian dominions in Spain, here were deposited all their naval stores, machines used in war, besides immense treasures.  It was on this account extremely well fortified, and to attempt to take it by a regular siege seemed to Scipio impracticable:  he, therefore, formed a plan to take it by surprise, and this plan he communicated to C. Laelius, the commander of the fleet, who was his intimate friend.  The Roman fleet was to block up the port by sea, while Scipio was to blockade it by land.  The ignorance of the Romans with regard to one of the most common and natural phenomena of the sea, is strongly marked in the course of this enterprise.  Scipio knew that