This is what makes Browning think it impossible to re-establish faith in God, except by turning his back on knowledge; but whether it is possible for him to appeal to the moral consciousness, we shall inquire in the next chapter.

CHAPTER X.

THE HEART AND THE HEAD.—­LOVE AND REASON.

“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter."[A]

[Footnote A:  Milton’s Areopagitica.]

It has been shown that Browning appeals, in defence of his optimistic faith, from the intellect to the heart.  His theory rests on three main assumptions:—­namely (1) that knowledge of the true nature of things is impossible to man, and that, therefore, it is necessary to find other and better evidence than the intellect can give for the victory of good over evil; (2) that the failure of knowledge is a necessary condition of the moral life, inasmuch as certain knowledge would render all moral effort either futile or needless; (3) that after the failure of knowledge there still remains possible a faith of the heart, which can furnish a sufficient objective basis to morality and religion.  The first of these assumptions I endeavoured to deal with in the last chapter.  I now turn to the remaining two.

Demonstrative, or certain, or absolute knowledge of the actual nature of things would, Browning asserts, destroy the very possibility of a moral life.[A] For such knowledge would show either that evil is evil, or that evil is good; and, in both cases alike, the benevolent activity of love would be futile.  In the first case, it would be thwarted and arrested by despair; for, if evil be evil, it must remain evil for aught that man can do.  Man cannot effect a change in the nature of things, nor create a good in a world dominated by evil.  In the second case, the saving effect of moral love would be unnecessary; for, if evil be only seeming, then all things are perfect and complete, and there is no need of interference.  It is necessary, therefore, that man should be in a permanent state of doubt as to the real existence of evil; and, whether evil does exist or not, it must seem, and only seem to exist to man, in order that he may devote himself to the service of good.[B]

[Footnote A:  See Chapter VIII., p. 255.]

[Footnote B:  Ibid.]