But, on the side of knowledge, he was neither so deeply interested, nor had he so good a guide to lean upon.  Ignorant, according to all appearances, of the philosophy which has made the Christian maxim, “Die to live,”—­which primarily is only a principle of morality—­the basis of its theory of knowledge, he exaggerated the failure of science to reach the whole truth as to any particular object, into a qualitative discrepancy between knowledge and truth.  Because knowledge is never complete, it is always mere lacquered ignorance; and man’s apparent intellectual victories are only conquests in a land of unrealities, or mere phenomena.  He occupies in regard to knowledge, a position strictly analogous to that of Carlyle, in regard to morality; his intellectual pessimism is the counterpart of the moral pessimism of his predecessor, and it springs from the same error.  He forgot that the ideal without is also the power within, which makes for its own manifestation in the mind of man.

He opposed the intellect to the world, as Carlyle opposed the weakness of man to the law of duty; and he neglected the fact that the world was there for him, only because he knew it, just as Carlyle neglected the fact that the duty was without, only because it was recognized within.  He strained the difference between the ideal and actual into an absolute distinction; and, as Carlyle condemned man to strive for a goodness which he could never achieve, so Browning condemns him to pursue a truth which he can never attain.  In both, the failure is regarded as absolute.  “There is no good in us,” has for its counterpart “There is no truth in us.”  Both the moralist and the poet dwell on the negative relation of the ideal and actual, and forget that the negative has no meaning, except as the expression of a deeper affirmative.  Carlyle had to learn that we know our moral imperfection, only because we are conscious of a better within us; and Browning had to learn that we are aware of our ignorance, only because we have the consciousness of fuller truth with which we contrast our knowledge.  Browning, indeed, knew that the consciousness of evil was itself evidence of the presence of good, that perfection means death, and progress is life, on the side of morals; but he has missed the corresponding truth on the side of knowledge.  If he acknowledges that the highest revealed itself to man, on the practical side, as love; he does not see that it has also manifested itself to man, on the theoretical side, as reason.  The self-communication of the Infinite is incomplete love is a quality of God, intelligence a quality of man; hence, on one side, there is no limit to achievement, but on the other there is impotence.  Human nature is absolutely divided against itself; and the division, as we have already seen, is not between flesh and spirit, but between a love which is God’s own and perfect, and an intelligence which is merely man’s and altogether weak and deceptive.