The most interesting feature of Browning’s proof of his optimistic faith is his appeal from the intelligence to the moral consciousness.  To show theoretically that evil is merely phenomenal is, in his view, both impossible and undesirable.  It is impossible, because the human intellect is incapable of knowing anything as it really is, or of pronouncing upon the ultimate nature of any phenomenon.  It is undesirable, because a theoretical proof of the evanescence of evil would itself give rise to the greatest of all evils.  The best thing in the world is moral character.  Man exists in order to grow better, and the world exists in order to help him.  But moral growth is possible only through conflict against evil, or what seems to be evil; hence, to disprove the existence of evil would be to take away the possibility of learning goodness, to stultify all human effort, and to deprive the world of its meaning.

But, if an optimistic doctrine cannot be reached by way of speculative thought, if the intellect of man cannot see the good in things evil, his moral consciousness guarantees that all is for the best, and that “the good is all in all.”  For, in distinguishing between good and evil, the moral consciousness sets up an ideal over against the actual.  It conceives of a scheme of goodness which is not realized in the world, and it condemns the world as it is.  Man, as moral being, is so constituted that he cannot but regard the evil in the world as something to be annulled.  If he had only the power, there would be no pain, no sorrow, no weakness, no failure, no death.  Is man, then, better than the Power which made the world and let woe gain entrance into it?  No! answers the poet; for man himself is part of that world and the product of that Power.  The Power that made the world also made the moral consciousness which condemns the world; if it is the source of the evil in the world, it is also the source of that love in man, which, by self-expenditure, seeks to remedy it.  If the external world is merely an expression of a remorseless Power, whence comes the love which is the principle of the moral life in man?  The same Power brings the antidote as well as the bane.  And, further, the bane exists for the sake of the antidote, the wrong for the sake of the remedy.  The evil in the world is means to a higher good, and the only means possible; for it calls into activity the divine element in man, and thereby contributes to its realization in his character.  It gives the necessary opportunity for the exercise of love.

Hence, evil cannot be regarded as ultimately real.  It is real only as a stage in growth, as means to an end; and the means necessarily perishes, or is absorbed in, the attainment of the end.  It has no significance except by reference to that end.  From this point of view, evil is the resistance which makes progress possible, the negative which gives meaning to the positive, the darkness that makes day beautiful.  This must not, however, be taken to