Chapter II.
On the need of A philosophy
of life
Chapter III.
Browning’s place in English
poetry
Chapter IV.
Browning’s optimism
Chapter V.
Optimism and ethics: Their
contradiction
Chapter VI.
Browning’s treatment of the
principle
of love
Chapter VII.
Browning’s idealism, and its
philosophical
justification
Chapter VIII.
Browning’s solution of the
problem
of evil
Chapter IX.
A criticism of Browning’s view
of
the failure of knowledge
Chapter X.
The heart and the head.—Love
and
reason
Chapter XI.
Conclusion
ROBERT BROWNING.
CHAPTER I.
Introduction.
“Grau, theurer Freund, ist alle
Theorie,
Und gruen des Lebens goldner Baum.”
(Faust.)
There is a saying of Hegel’s, frequently quoted, that “a great man condemns the world to the task of explaining him.” The condemnation is a double one, and it generally falls heaviest on the great man himself, who has to submit to explanation; and, probably, the last refinement of this species of cruelty is to expound a poet. I therefore begin with an apology in both senses of the term. I acknowledge that no commentator on art has a right to be heard, if he is not aware of the subordinate and temporary nature of his office. At the very best he is only a guide to the beautiful object, and he must fall back in silence so soon as he has led his company into its presence. He may perhaps suggest “the line of vision,” or fix the point of view, from which we can best hope to do justice to the artist’s work, by appropriating his intention and comprehending his idea; but if he seeks to serve the ends of art, he will not attempt to do anything more.
In order to do even this successfully, it is essential that every judgment passed should be exclusively ruled by the principles which govern art. “Fine art is not real art till it is free”; that is, till its value is recognized as lying wholly within itself. And it is not, unfortunately, altogether unnecessary to insist that, so far from enhancing the value of an artist’s work, we only degrade it into mere means, subordinate it to uses alien, and therefore antagonistic to its perfection, if we