Of course the better class of the people were not accountable for this state of affairs, and I do not remember that I greatly blamed the others.  The country was full of the “elements of combustion.”  The people were impoverished and smarting with a sense of defeat.  Organized resistance was no longer possible, but many men trained to the use of arms did not consider themselves included in the surrender and conscientiously believed it both right and expedient to prolong the struggle by private enterprise.  Many, no doubt, made the easy and natural transition from soldiering to assassination by insensible degrees, unconscious of the moral difference, such as it is.  Selma was little better than a ruin; in the concluding period of the war General Wilson’s cavalry had raided it and nearly destroyed it, and the work begun by the battery had been completed by the torch.  The conflagration was generally attributed to the negroes, who certainly augmented it, for a number of those suspected of the crime were flung into the flames by the maddened populace.  None the less were the Yankee invaders held responsible.

Every Northern man represented some form or phase of an authority which these luckless people horribly hated, and to which they submitted only because, and in so far as, they had to.  Fancy such a community, utterly without the restraints of law and with no means of ascertaining public opinion—­for newspapers were not—­denied even the moral advantage of the pulpit!  Considering what human nature has the misfortune to be, it is wonderful that there was so little of violence and crime.

As the carcass invites the vulture, this prostrate land drew adventurers from all points of the compass.  Many, I am sorry to say, were in the service of the United States Government.  Truth to tell, the special agents of the Treasury were themselves, as a body, not altogether spotless.  I could name some of them, and some of their assistants, who made large fortunes by their opportunities.  The special agents were allowed one-fourth of the value of the confiscated cotton for expenses of collection—­none too much, considering the arduous and perilous character of the service; but the plan opened up such possibilities of fraud as have seldom been accorded by any system of conducting the public business, and never without disastrous results to official morality.  Against bribery no provision could have provided an adequate safeguard; the magnitude of the interests involved was too great, the administration of the trust too loose and irresponsible.  The system as it was, hastily devised in the storm and stress of a closing war, broke down in the end, and it is doubtful if the Government might not more profitably have let the “captured and abandoned property” alone.