of the jury was a mistake.  The Russian people, it was held, was not yet ripe for such an institution, and numerous anecdotes were related in support of this opinion.  One jury, for instance, was said to have returned a verdict of “Not guilty with extenuating circumstances”; and another, being unable to come to a decision, was reported to have cast lots before an Icon, and to have given a verdict in accordance with the result!  Besides this, juries often gave a verdict of “not guilty” when the accused made a full and formal confession to the court.

How far the comic anecdotes are true I do not undertake to decide, but I venture to assert that such incidents, if they really occur, are too few to form the basis of a serious indictment.  The fact, however, that juries often acquit prisoners who openly confess their crime is beyond all possibility of doubt.

To most Englishmen this fact will probably seem sufficient to prove that the introduction of the institution was at least premature, but before adopting this sweeping conclusion it will be well to examine the phenomenon a little more closely in connection with Russian criminal procedure as a whole.

In England the Bench is allowed very great latitude in fixing the amount of punishment.  The jury can therefore confine themselves to the question of fact and leave to the judge the appreciation of extenuating circumstances.  In Russia the position of the jury is different.  The Russian criminal law fixes minutely the punishment for each category of crimes, and leaves almost no latitude to the judge.  The jury know that if they give a verdict of guilty, the prisoner will inevitably be punished according to the Code.  Now the Code, borrowed in great part from foreign legislation, is founded on conceptions very different from those of the Russian people, and in many cases it attaches heavy penalties to acts which the ordinary Russian is wont to regard as mere peccadilloes, or positively justifiable.  Even in those matters in which the Code is in harmony with the popular morality, there are many exceptional cases in which summum jus is really summa injuria.  Suppose, for instance—­as actually happened in a case which came under my notice—­that a fire breaks out in a village, and that the Village Elder, driven out of patience by the apathy and laziness of some of his young fellow-villagers, oversteps the limits of his authority as defined by law, and accompanies his reproaches and exhortations with a few lusty blows.  Surely such a man is not guilty of a very heinous crime—­certainly he is not in the opinion of the peasantry—­and yet if he be prosecuted and convicted he inevitably falls into the jaws of an article of the Code which condemns to transportation for a long term of years.