[Footnote 1:  Exod. xxii. 25.]

[Footnote 2:  Lev. xxv. 35.]

[Footnote 3:  Deut. xxiii. 19.]

It is unnecessary for us to discuss the underlying considerations which prompted these ordinances.  Dr. Cleary, who has studied the matter with great care, concludes that:  ’The legislator was urged mostly by economic considerations....  The permission to extract usury from strangers—­a permission which later writers, such as Maimonides, regarded as a command—­clearly favours the view that the legislator was guided by economic principles.  It is more difficult to say whether he based his legislation on the principle that usury is intrinsically unjust—­that is to say, unjust even when taken in moderation.  There is really nothing in the texts quoted to enable us to decide.  The universality of the prohibition when there is question solely of Jews goes to show that usury as such was regarded as unjust; whilst its permission as between Jew and Gentile favours the contradictory hypothesis.’[1] Modern Jewish thought is inclined to hold the view that these prohibitions were based upon the assumption that usury was intrinsically unjust, but that the taking of usury from the Gentiles was justified on the principle of compensation; in other words, that Jews might exact usury from those who might exact it from them.[2] It is at least certain that usury was regarded by the writers of the Old Testament as amongst the most terrible of sins.[3]

[Footnote 1:  Op. cit., pp. 5-6.]

[Footnote 2:  Jewish Encyclopaedia, art.  ‘Usury.’]

[Footnote 3:  Ezek. xviii. 13; Jer. xv. 10; Ps. xiv. 5, cix. 11, cxii. 5; Prov. xxviii. 8; Hes. xviii. 8; 2 Esd. v.  I et seq.]

The general attitude of the Jews towards usury cannot be better explained than by quoting Dr. Cleary’s final conclusion on the subject:  ’It appears therefore that in the Old Testament usury was universally prohibited between Israelite and Israelite, whilst it was permitted between Israelite and Gentile.  Furthermore, it seems impossible to decide what was the nature of the obligations imposed—­whether the prohibition supposed and ratified an already existing universal obligation, in charity or justice, or merely imposed a new obligation in obedience, binding the consciences of men for economic or political reasons.  So, too, it seems impossible to decide absolutely whether the decrees were intended to possess eternal validity; the probabilities, however, seem to favour very strongly the view that they were intended as mere economic regulations suited to the circumstances of the time.  This does not, of course, decide the other question, whether, apart from such positive regulations, there already existed an obligation arising from the natural law; nor would the passing of the positive law into desuetude affect the existence of the other obligation.’[1]

[Footnote 1:  Op. cit., pp. 17-18.]