[Footnote 2:  The argument in favour of what we have called the ‘objective’ theory of the just price is strengthened by the consideration that goods do not satisfy mere subjective whims, but supply real wants.  For example, food supplies a real need of the human being, as also does clothing; in the one case hunger is appeased, and in the other cold is warded off, just as drugs used in medical practice produce real objective effects on the person taking them.]

The theory that the just price was objective seems to be accepted by the majority of the best modern students of the subject.  Sir William Ashley says:  ’The fundamental difference between the mediaeval and modern point of view is... that with us value is something entirely subjective; it is what each individual cares to give for a thing.  With Aquinas it was entirely objective; something outside the will of the individual purchaser or seller; something attached to the thing itself, existing whether he liked it or not, and that he ought to recognise.’[1] Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, following the authority of Knies, expresses the same opinion:  ’Perhaps the contrast between mediaeval and modern ideas of value is best expressed by saying that with us value is usually something subjective, consisting of the mental determination of buyer and seller, while to the schoolmen it was in a sense objective, something intrinsically bound up with the commodity itself.’[2] Dr. Ryan agrees with this view:  ’The theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries assumed that the objective price would be fair, since it was determined by the social estimate.  In their opinion the social estimate would embody the requirements of objective justice as fully as any device or institution that was practically available.  For the condition of the Middle Ages and the centuries immediately following, this reasoning was undoubtedly correct.  The agencies which created the social estimate and determined prices—­namely the civil law, the guilds, and custom—­succeeded fairly in establishing a price that was equitable to all concerned.’[3] Dr. Cleary says:  ’True, the pretium legale is regarded as being a just price, but in order that it may be just, it supposes some objective basis—­in other words, it rather declares than constitutes the just price.’[4] Haney is also strongly of opinion that the just price was objective.  ’Briefly stated, the doctrine was that every commodity had some one true value which was objective and absolute.’[5] The greater number of modern students therefore who have given most care and attention to the question are inclined to the opinion that the just price was not subjective, but objective, and we see no valid reason for disagreeing with this view, which seems to be fully warranted by the original authorities.

[Footnote 1:  Op. cit., vol. i. pt. i. p. 140.]

[Footnote 2:  Art.  ‘Justum Pretium.’]

[Footnote 3:  ‘The Moral Aspect of Monopoly,’ by J.A.  Ryan, D.D., Irish Theological Quarterly, in. p. 275; and see Distributive Justice, pp. 332-4.]