[Footnote 3:  De Monte Pietatis.]

The general feeling of the Church, however, was in favour of the montes.  It was felt that, if the poor must borrow, it was better that they should borrow at a low rate of interest from philanthropic institutions than at an extortionate rate from usurers; several montes were established under the direct protection of the Popes;[1] and finally, in 1515, the Lateran Council gave an authoritative judgment in favour of the montes.  This decree contains an excellent definition of usury as it had come to be accepted at that date:  ’Usury is when gain is sought to be acquired from the use of a thing, not fruitful in itself, without labour, expense, or risk on the part of the lender.’[2]

[Footnote 1:  Cleary, op. cit., p. 111.]

[Footnote 2:  Ashley, op. cit., vol. i. pt. ii. p. 451.]

It was generally admitted by the theologians that the taking of usury might be permitted by the civil authorities, although it was insisted that acting in accordance with this permission did not absolve the conscience of the usurer.  Albertus Magnus conceded that ’although usury is contrary to the perfection of Christian laws, it is at least not contrary to civil interests’;[1] and Aquinas also justified the toleration of usury by the State:  ’Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many advantages if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them.  Wherefore human law has permitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonising with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hindered.’[2] Although this opinion was controverted by AEgidius Romanus,[3] it was generally accepted by later writers.  Thus Gerson says that ’the civil law, when it tolerates usury in some cases, must not be said to be always contrary to the law of God or the Church.  The civil legislator, acting in the manner of a wise doctor, tolerates lesser evils that greater ones may be avoided.  It is obviously less of an evil that slight usury should be permitted for the relief of want, than that men should be driven by their want to rob or steal, or to sell their goods at an unfairly low price.’[4] Buridan explains that the attitude of the State towards usury must never be more than one of toleration; it must not actively approve of usury, but it may tacitly refuse to punish it.[5]

[Footnote 1:  Rambaud, op. cit., p. 65; Espinas, op. cit., p. 103.]

[Footnote 2:  II. ii. 78, 1, ad. 3.]

[Footnote 3:  De Reg.  Prin., ii. 3, 11.]

[Footnote 4:  De Cont., ii. 17.]

[Footnote 5:  Quaest. super.  Lib.  Eth., iv. 6.]

Sec. 7. The Justice of Unearned Income.