The first clear recognition of the title lucrum cessans occurs in a letter from Alexander III., written in 1176, and addressed to the Archbishop of Genoa:  ’You tell us that it often happens in your city that people buy pepper and cinnamon and other wares, at the time worth not more than five pounds, promising those from whom they received them six pounds at an appointed time.  Though contracts of this kind and under such a form cannot strictly be called usurious, yet, nevertheless, the vendors incur guilt, unless they are really doubtful whether the wares might be worth more or less at the time of payment.  Your citizens will do well for their own salvation to cease from such contracts.’[1] As Dr. Cleary points out, the trader is held by this decision to be entitled to a recompense on account of a probable loss of profit, and the decision consequently amounts to a recognition of the title lucrum cessans.[2] The title is also recognised by Scotus and Hostiensis.[3]

[Footnote 1:  Decr.  Greg. v. 5, 6.]

[Footnote 2:  Op. cit., p. 67.]

[Footnote 3:  Ibid., p. 99.]

The attitude of Aquinas to the admission of lucrum cessans is obscure.  In the article on usury he expressly states that ’the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money, because he must not sell that which he has not yet, and may be prevented in many ways from having.’[1] Two comments must be made on this passage; first, that it only refers to making a stipulation in advance for compensation for profit lost, and does not condemn the actual payment of compensation;[2] second, that the point is made that the probability of gaining a profit on money is so problematical as to make it unsaleable.  As Ashley points out, the latter consideration was peculiarly important at the time when the Summa was composed; and, when in the course of the following two centuries the opportunities for reasonably safe and profitable business investments increased, the great theologians conceived that they were following the real thought of Aquinas by giving to this explanation a pure contemporanea expositio.  The argument in favour of this construction is strengthened by a reference to the article of the Summa dealing with restitution,[3] where it is pointed out that a man may suffer in two ways—­first, by being deprived of what he actually has, and, second, by being prevented from obtaining what he was on his way to obtain.  In the former case an equivalent must always be restored, but in the latter it is not necessary to make good an equivalent, ’because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so, were he to be indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary for salvation.