a close.  When I read the curiously modified statement that I have “studiously avoided committing myself to a belief in a universal Father, or a moral Governor, or even in a Personal God,” it seems clear to me that the Supernatural Religion about which Dr. Lightfoot has been writing cannot be my work, but is simply a work of his own imagination.  That work cannot possibly have contained, for instance, the chapter on “Anthropomorphic Divinity,” [36:2] in which, on the contrary, I studiously commit myself to very decided disbelief in such a “Personal God” as he means.  In no way inconsistent with that chapter are my concluding remarks, contrasting with the spasmodic Jewish Divinity a Supreme Being manifested in the operation of invariable laws—­whose very invariability is the guarantee of beneficence and security.  If Dr. Lightfoot, however, succeeded in convicting me of inconsistency in those final expressions, there could be no doubt which view must logically be abandoned, and it would be a new sensation to secure the approval of a divine by the unhesitating destruction of the last page of my work.

Dr. Lightfoot, again, refers to Mr. Mill’s “Three Essays on Religion,” but he does not appear to have very deeply studied that work.  I confess that I do not entirely agree with some views therein expressed, and I hope that, hereafter, I may have an opportunity of explaining what they are; but I am surprised that Dr. Lightfoot has failed to observe how singularly that great Thinker supports the general results of Supernatural Religion, to the point even of a frequent agreement almost in words.  If Dr. Lightfoot had studied Mill a little more closely, he would not have committed the serious error of arguing:  “Obviously, if the author has established his conclusions in the first part, the second and third are altogether superfluous.  It is somewhat strange, therefore, that more than three-fourths of the whole work should be devoted to this needless task.” [37:1] Now my argument in the first part is not that miracles are impossible—­a thesis which it is quite unnecessary to maintain—­but the much more simple one that miracles are antecedently incredible.  Having shown that they are so, and appreciated the true nature of the allegation of miracles, and the amount of evidence requisite to establish it, I proceed to examine the evidence which is actually produced in support of the assertion that, although miracles are antecedently incredible, they nevertheless took place.  Mr. Mill clearly supports me in this course.  He states the main principle of my argument thus:  “A revelation, therefore, cannot be proved divine unless by external evidence; that is, by the exhibition of supernatural facts.  And we have to consider, whether it is possible to prove supernatural facts, and if it is, what evidence is required to prove them.” [37:2] Mr. Mill decides that it is possible to prove the occurrence of a supernatural fact, if it actually occurred, and after showing the