A state of peace, whether between individuals or nations, whether without or within a regime of law, always partakes of the nature of an armed truce:  under one regime, however, the arms are borne by the possible contestants themselves; under the other, by the community whose members they are.  If there is a resort to arms, violence ensues under both regimes; in both cases it tends ultimately to restore peace, but the action is more certain and more systematic when the violence is exerted by the community.

These laws may apply indifferently to a community of individuals or to one of nations.  The most cogent and the most valid argument at the disposal of the peace advocate is the fact that we no longer allow the individual to take the law into his own hand, and that logically we should equally prohibit the nation from doing so.  This is unanswerable, but its force has been greatly weakened by the assumption, which it requires no great astuteness to find unwarranted, that the settlement of individual quarrels by individual force has resulted from—­or at least resulted in—­the discontinuance of violence altogether, or in the dawn of a general era of good-will, man to man.  On the contrary, it is very doubtful whether there is less violence to-day than there would be if the operation of law were suspended altogether; the difference, is that the violence has shifted its incidence and altered its aim—­it is civic and social and no longer individual.

If we are to introduce the regime of law among nations as among individuals, our first step must be similarly to shift the incidence of violence.  In so doing we may not decrease it, we may, indeed, increase it—­but we shall none the less be taking that step in the only possible direction to achieve our purpose.

Among individuals, custom, crystallizing into law, generally precedes the enforcement of that law by the community.  Hence, a somewhat elaborate code may exist side by side with the settlement of disputes, under that code, by personal combat.  We have among nations such a code, and we yet admit the settlement of disputes by war, because the incidence of violence has not yet completely shifted.  We have established a tribunal to act, in certain cases, on behalf of the community of nations, but we have not yet given that tribunal complete jurisdiction and we have given it no power whatever to enforce its decrees.  It is on this latter point that I desire to dwell.  In a community of individuals, there are two ways of using violence to enforce law—­by the professional police force and by the posse of citizens.  The former is more effective, but the latter is often readier and more certain in particular instances, especially in primitive communities.  To give it force we must have readiness on the part of every citizen to respond to a call from the proper officer, and ability to do effective service, especially by the possession of arms and skill in their use.  These requisites are not generally found in more advanced communities.