of either becoming an active man of business himself, or of ministering, like other sovereigns, through his Ministers.  Up to the present time many causes have concurred to occasion him to endeavour to be his own Minister, and to treat those to whom he gives that name as mere clerks.  He is jealous and suspicious, fond of power, and impatient of contradiction.  With the exception of Drouyn de l’Huys, the eminent men of France, her statesmen and her generals, stand aloof from him.  Those who are not in exile have retired from public life, and offer neither assistance nor advice.  Advice, indeed, he refuses, and, what is still more useful than advice, censure, he punishes.

’But the war, though it must last longer, and cost, more in men and in money than it would have done if it were managed with more intelligence and activity, must end favourably.  Ill managed as it has been by France, it has been worse managed by Russia.  It is impossible that that semi-barbarous empire, with its scarcely sane autocrat, its corrupt administration, its disordered finances, and its heterogeneous populations, should ultimately triumph over the two most powerful nations of Europe, flanked by Austria, and disposing of the fanatical valour of Turkey.  If Louis Napoleon pleases the vanity of France by military glory, and rewards her exertions by a triumphant peace; if he employs his absolute power in promoting her prosperity by further relaxing the fetters which encumber her industry; if he takes advantage of the popularity which a successful war, an honourable peace, and internal prosperity must confer on him, to give to her a little real liberty and a little real self-government; if he gradually subsides from a [Greek:  Tyrannos] to a [Greek:  Basileus]; if he allows some liberty of the press, some liberty of election, some liberty of discussion, and some liberty of decision; he may pass the remainder of his agitated life in the tranquil exercise of limited, but great and secure power, the ally of England, and the benefactor of France.

’If this expectation should be realised—­and we repeat, that among many contingencies it appears to us to be the least improbable—­it affords to Europe the best hope of undisturbed peace and progressive civilisation and prosperity.  An alliance with England was one of the favourite dreams of the first Napoleon.  He believed, and with reason, that England and France united could dictate to all Europe.  But in this respect, as indeed in all others, his purposes were selfish.  Being master of France, he wished France to be mistress of the world.  All that he gave to France was power, all that he required from Europe was submission.  The objects for which he desired our co-operation were precisely those which we wished to defeat.  The friendship from which we recoiled in disgust, almost in terror, was turned into unrelenting hatred; and in the long struggle which followed, each party felt that its safety depended on the total ruin of the other.