he does not have, nor ever had in his possession, it was quite clear that the case was not comprehended in the said treaty.  Neither was it provided for nor determined in the treaty, which was not to be extended, nor did extend to more than was expressly mentioned and set down therein, which it did determine.  Rather this appeared to be a new case, omitted and unprovided for by the treaty, which must be determined and decided by common sense or common law.

Accordingly, since this matter was outside of the said treaty, we were not bound by the treaty, nor in any other manner to leave our right unexamined, nor was it either reasonable or proper to restore immediately in order to have to petition later, thus making ourselves, contrary to all ideas of equity and good faith, original criminal, prosecutor, or plaintiff; especially as it would be impossible or very difficult to recover what we should restore.  For this very reason even the restitution of what was well known to be stolen was deferred by law, until the case of ownership was decided.

Furthermore the right of our ownership and possession was evident because of our just occupation.  At least it could not be denied that we had based our intention on common law, according to which newly-found islands and mainlands, belonged to and remain his who occupied and took possession of them first, especially if taken possession of under the apostolic authority, to which—­or according to the opinion of others, to the Emperor—­it is only conceded to give this power.  Since we, the said authorities, possessed these lands more completely than any other, and since the fact of our occupation and possession was quite evident, it followed clearly and conclusively that we ought to be protected in our rule and possession, and that whenever anyone should desire anything from us, he must sue us for it; and in such suit must be the occasion for examining the virtue and strength of the titles, the priority, and the authority of the occupation alleged by each party to the suit.

Meanwhile, and until it should be stated legally before one or the other, and that there ought to be a better right than ours, which we neither knew nor believed, we would base our intention upon common law.  Therefore we held and possessed Maluco justly, since our title to acquire dominions therein was and is just and sufficient; and from common law arose, both then and now, our good faith and just intention.  Our good faith and the justice of our side was apparent by these and other reasons, by the said treaty in what falls within its scope, and by common law and common sense in what falls outside it, or by all jointly.  There was no reason or just cause in what the ambassadors petitioned, as formerly in this matter of possession, Silveira, ambassador of our brother, the most serene King of Portugal, the first to come upon this business, had been given thoroughly to understand.  Now inasmuch as my wish has ever been, past and present,