The Jesuits have signally failed to convince the world that the type of character produced by their system is worthy of admiration. The “sacrifice of the intellect”—a familiar watchword of the Jesuit—is far too high a price to pay for whatever benefits the discipline may confer. It is contrary to human nature, and hence to the divine intention, to keep a human soul in a state of subordination to another human will. As Von Hoensbroech says of the society: “Who gave it a right to break down that most precious possession of the individual being, which God gave, and which man has no authority to take away?”
It is true that no human organization has so magnificently brought to perfection a unity of purpose and oneness of will. It is also true that a spirit of defiance toward human authority is often accompanied by a disobedience of divine law. But the remedy for the abuses of human freedom is neither in the annihilation of the will itself, nor in its mere subjection to some other will irrespective of its moral character. Carlyle may have been too vehement in some of his censures of Jesuitism, but he certainly exposed the fallaciousness of Loyola’s views concerning the value of mere obedience, at the same time justly rebuking the too ardent admirers of the perverted principle: “I hear much also of ‘obedience,’ how that and kindred virtues are prescribed and exemplified by Jesuitism; the truth of which, and the merit of which, far be it from me to deny.... Obedience is good and indispensable: but if it be obedience to what is wrong and false, good heavens, there is no name for such a depth of human cowardice and calamity, spurned everlastingly by the gods. Loyalty? Will you be loyal to Beelzebub? Will you ’make a covenant with Death and Hell’? I will not be loyal to Beelzebub; I will become a nomadic Choctaw rather, ... anything and everything is venial to that.”
The Casuistry of the Jesuits
It is often asserted, even by authoritative writers, that a Jesuit is bound by his vows to commit either venial or mortal sin at the command of his superior; and that the maxim, “The end justifies the means,” has not only been the principle upon which the society has prosecuted its work but is also explicitly taught in the rules of the order. There is nothing in the constitution of the society to justify these two serious charges, which are not to be regarded as malicious calumnies, however, because the slovenly Latin in one of the rules on obedience has misled such competent scholars as John Addington Symonds and the historian Ranke. Furthermore, judging from the doctrines of the society as set forth by many of their theologians and the political conduct of its representatives, the conclusion seems inevitable that while the society may not teach in its rules that its members are bound to obedience even to the point of sin, yet practically many of its leaders have so held and its emissaries have rendered that kind of obedience.