of nature had been greatly dimmed in the darkness of sin and lust.  But he had not succeeded in annihilating his conscience, and hence, in a sober hour, he left upon record his own damnation.  He expressly informed the whole cultivated classical world, who were to read his polished numbers, that he that had taught others had not taught himself; that he who had said that a man should not commit adultery had himself committed adultery; that an educated Roman who never saw the volume of inspiration, and never heard of either Moses or Christ, nevertheless approved of and praised a virtue that he never put in practice.  And whoever will turn to the pages of Horace, a kindred spirit to Ovid both in respect to a most exquisite taste and a most refined earthliness, will frequently find the same confession breaking out.  Nay, open the volumes of Rousseau, and even of Voltaire, and read their panegyrics of virtue, their eulogies of goodness.  What are these, but testimonies that they, too, saw the right and did the wrong.  It is true, that the eulogy is merely sentimentalism, and is very different from the sincere and noble tribute which a good man renders to goodness.  Still, it is valid testimony to the truth that the mere approbation of goodness is not the love of it.  It is true, that these panegyrics of virtue, when read in the light of Rousseau’s sensuality and Voltaire’s malignity, wear a dead and livid hue, like objects seen in the illumination from phosphorus or rotten wood; yet, nevertheless, they are visible and readable, and testify as distinctly as if they issued from elevated and noble natures, that the teachings of man’s conscience are not obeyed by man’s heart,—­that a man may praise and admire virtue, while he loves and practises vice.

II.  A second proof that the approbation of goodness is not the love of it is found in the fact, that it is impossible not to approve of goodness, while it is possible not to love it.  The structure of man’s conscience is such, that he can commend only the right; but the nature of his will is such, that he may be conformed to the right or the wrong.  The conscience can give only one judgment; but the heart and will are capable of two kinds of affection, and two courses of action.  Every rational creature is shut up, by his moral sense, to but one moral conviction.  He must approve the right and condemn the wrong.  He cannot approve the wrong and condemn the right; any more than he can perceive that two and two make five.  The human conscience is a rigid and stationary faculty.  Its voice may be stifled or drowned, for a time; but it can never be made to titter two discordant voices.  It is for this reason, that the approbation of goodness is necessary and universal.  Wicked men and wicked angels must testify that benevolence is right, and malevolence is wrong; though they hate the former, and love the latter.