defections, and mal-administrations in the church, could never have been a warrantable ground (which yet they make the only ground) of their separation from her.  “But on the contrary,” they should still have continued in communion with her, and subjection to her in matters lawful, in a way of testifying “against the same, and essaying their reformation, by all means that were habile for them.” Seceders must either grant, that such was their duty, and so of themselves condemn their separation as unwarrantable; or else deny, that the qualifications of the magistrate and minister are required in the same express terms in scripture; that both are clothed with an equal (though distinct) authority; and that subjection and obedience are under the same pains enjoined to both, and consequently say, that it is less dangerous to cast off, contemn and disregard the authority of a church, than that of the state; while yet (according to their scheme) civil authority is entirely resolved into, and depends purely upon the changeable will of civil society.  But, it is presumed, they will allow, that ecclesiastical authority is derived, and flows from, and depends entirely upon the Lord Jesus Christ alone, the glorious Judge, Lawgiver, and King of his church; so that (according to them) this being of a far more noble extract and original, it must be of far more dangerous consequence, to contemn and cast off it, than the other.

Again, as this doctrine gives unto men a negative over the Holy One of Israel, it also opens a wide door for introducing and enforcing the cause of deism, already too prevalent:  for, if all who are set up by civil society, however wicked, and void of the qualifications God has required, while they are acknowledged and submitted to by their constituents, must be equally regarded as God’s ordinance, with those who have those qualifications; then it will follow, that the corrupt will of wicked men legitimates the magistrate’s office and authority, not only without, but in contradiction to the preceptive will of God; and what is this (absit blasphemia), but to exalt man above God, in giving unto the universal Sovereign and Supreme Lawgiver, only a consultative power in the constitution of magistracy, while it ascribes unto man an absolute and definitive power, whereby they have power to receive or reject the law of God (at least respecting magistracy) at pleasure, and their deed of constitution be equally valid, when opposite, as when agreeable unto, and founded upon his righteous law.  And sure, by the same reason, that man may take a liberty to dispense with the authority of God, in one point of his commanding will; he may also in another, until at last every part of it is rejected.  It is but a contempt of the same authority, and he that offends in one point, is guilty of all.  Such are the absurdities that this their scheme leads to, though it is hoped the authors do not intend so.  It may here be only necessary further to observe, that among the other