But now for those, who from that ground, “that out of nothing, nothing is made,” infer the world’s eternity, and yet not so savage therein, as those are, which give an eternal being to dead matter, it is true if the word (nothing) be taken in the affirmative, and the making, imposed upon natural agents and finite power; that out of nothing, nothing is made.  But seeing their great doctor Aristotle himself confesseth, “quod omnes antiqui decreverunt quasi quodam return principium, ipsumque infinitum” “That all the ancient decree a kind of beginning, and the same to be infinite”; and a little after, more largely and plainly, “Principium eius est nullum, sed ipsum omnium cernitur esse principium, ac omnia complecti ac regere",[35] it is strange that this philosopher, with his followers, should rather make choice out of falsehood, to conclude falsely, than out of truth, to resolve truly.  For if we compare the world universal, and all the unmeasureable orbs of Heaven, and those marvellous bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, with “ipsum infinitum”:  it may truly be said of them all, which himself affirms of his imaginary “Materia prima,"[36] that they are neither “quid, quale,” nor “quantum “; and therefore to bring finite (which hath no proportion with infinite) out of infinite ("qui destruit omnem proportionem"[37]) is no wonder in God’s power.  And therefore Anaximander, Melissus, and Empedocles, call the world universal, but “particulam universitatis” and “infinitatis,” a parcel of that which is the universality and the infinity inself; and Plato, but a shadow of God.  But the other to prove the world’s eternity, urgeth this maxim, “that, a sufficient and effectual cause being granted, an answerable effect thereof is also granted”:  inferring that God being forever a sufficient and effectual cause of the world, the effect of the cause should also have been forever; to wit, the world universal.  But what a strange mockery is this in so great a master, to confess a sufficient and effectual cause of the world, (to wit, an almighty God) in his antecedent; and the same God to be a God restrained in his conclusion; to make God free in power, and bound in will; able to effect, unable to determine; able to make all things, and yet unable to make choice of the time when?  For this were impiously to resolve of God, as of natural necessity; which hath neither choice, nor will, nor understanding; which cannot but work matter being present:  as fire, to burn things combustible.  Again he thus disputeth, that every agent which can work, and doth not work, if it afterward work, it is either thereto moved by itself, or by somewhat else:  and so it passeth from power to act.  But God (saith he) is immovable, and is neither moved by himself, nor by any other:  but being always the same, doth always work.  Whence he concludeth, if the world were caused by God, that he was forever the cause thereof:  and therefore eternal.  The answer to this is very easy, for that God’s