From these defects in our laws, and the want of some discretionary power safely lodged, to exert upon emergencies; as well as from the great acquirements of able men, to elude the penalties of those laws they break, it is no wonder, the injuries done to the public, are so seldom redressed. But besides, no individual suffers, by any wrong he does to the commonwealth, in proportion to the advantage he gains by doing it. There are seven or eight millions who contribute to the loss, while the whole gain is sunk among a few. The damage suffered by the public, is not so immediately or heavily felt by particular persons, and the zeal of prosecution is apt to drop and be lost among numbers.
But imagine a set of politicians for many years at the head of affairs, the game visibly their own, and by consequence acting with great security: may not these be sometimes tempted to forget their caution, by length of time, by excess of avarice and ambition, by the insolence or violence of their nature, or perhaps by a mere contempt for their adversaries? May not such motives as these, put them often upon actions directly against the law, such as no evasions can be found for, and which will lay them fully open to the vengeance of a prevailing interest, whenever they are out of power? It is answered in the affirmative. And here we cannot refuse the late m[inistr]y their due praises, who foreseeing a storm, provided for their own safety, by two admirable expedients, by which, with great prudence, they have escaped the punishments due to pernicious counsels and corrupt management. The first, was to procure, under pretences hardly specious, a general Act of Indemnity,[8] which cuts off all impeachments. The second, was yet more refined: suppose, for instance, a counsel