It is not obvious to conceive what could move men who sat at home, and were called to consult upon the good of the kingdom, to be so utterly averse from putting an end to a long expensive war, which the victorious, as well as conquered side, were heartily weary of.  Few or none of them were men of the sword; they had no share in the honour; they had made large fortunes, and were at the head of all affairs.  But they well knew by what tenure they held their power; that the Qu[een] saw through their designs, that they had entirely lost the hearts of the clergy; that the landed men were against them; that they were detested by the body of the people; and that nothing bore them up but their credit with the bank and other stocks, which would be neither formidable nor necessary when the war was at an end.  For these reasons they resolved to disappoint all overtures of a peace, till they and their party should be so deeply rooted as to make it impossible to shake them.  To this end, they began to precipitate matters so fast, as in a little time must have ruined the constitution, if the crown had not interposed, and rather ventured the accidental effects of their malice, than such dreadful consequences of their power.  And indeed, had the former danger been greater than some hoped or feared, I see no difficulty in the choice, which was the same with his, who said, “he had rather be devoured by wolves than by rats.”  I therefore still insist that we cannot wonder at, or find fault with the army, for concurring with a ministry who was for prolonging the war.  The inclination is natural in them all, pardonable in those who have not yet made their fortunes, and as lawful in the rest, as love of power or love of money can make it.  But as natural, as pardonable, and as lawful as this inclination is, when it is not under check of the civil power, or when a corrupt ministry joins in giving it too great a scope, the consequence can be nothing less than infallible ruin and slavery to a state.

After I had finished this Paper, the printer sent me two small pamphlets, called “The Management of the War,"[9] written with some plausibility, much artifice, and abundance of misrepresentation, as well as direct falsehoods in point of fact.  These I have thought worth Examining_, which I shall accordingly do when I find an opportunity.

[Footnote 1:  No. 23 in the reprint. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 2:  I.e. 1710-11. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 3:  Cicero, “De Officiis,” i. 23:  “In the undertaking of a war there should be such a prospect, as if the only end of it were peace.”—­ SIR R. L’ESTRANGE. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 4:  See “Examiner,” No. 21. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 5:  Scott mistakes this as the pretended letter quoted in “The Medley,” No. 14.  Swift refers to a half sheet printed for A. Baldwin in the latter part of 1710, and entitled:  “The French King’s Thanks to the Tories of Great-Britain.”  It was ascribed to Hoadly.