Parliament will have no power to legislate; but the Post Office, so far as it relates to Ireland alone, will be handed over at once to the Irish Parliament—­although even in the case of Federal Unions such as Australia the Post Office is usually considered to be eminently a matter for the Federal authority.  And the question whether an Irish Act is unconstitutional and therefore void will be decided by the Privy Council, which will be regarded as an essentially English body; hence if it attempts to veto an Irish Act, its action will be at once denounced as a revival of Poyning’s Act and the Declaratory Act of George I.

The Bill excludes the relations with Foreign States from the powers of the Irish Parliament, but says nothing to prevent the Irish Government from appointing a political agent to the Vatican.  That is probably one of the first things that it will do; and as the Lord Lieutenant could never form a Government which would consent to any other course, he will be obliged to consent.  This agent, not being responsible to the British Foreign Office, may cause constant friction between England and Italy.

But quite apart from the unworkable provisions of the Bill, everything connected with its introduction and passing through Parliament has tended to increase the hatred which the Opposition feel towards it, and the determination of the Ulstermen to resist it if necessary even by force.  Those who lived in Australia whilst Federation was under discussion will recollect how carefully the scheme was brought before the people, discussed in various Colonial Parliaments, considered over again line by line by the delegates in an Inter-Colonial Conference, examined afresh in the Colonial Office in London and in the Imperial Parliament and finally laid before each colony for its acceptance.  Yet here is a matter which vitally affects the government not of Ireland only but of the whole United Kingdom, and thus indirectly of the Empire at large; it was (as I have shown) not fairly brought before the people at a general election; it has been introduced by what is admittedly merely a coalition Government as a matter of bargain between the various sections, at a time when the British Constitution is in a state of dislocation, as the power of the House of Lords has been destroyed and the new Upper Chamber not yet set up; and it has been passed without adequate discussion.  This I say deliberately; it is no use to point out how many hours have been spent in Committee, for the way in which the discussion has been conducted has deprived it of any real value.  The custom has been for the Government to state beforehand the time at which each batch of clauses is to be passed, and what amendments may be discussed (the rest being passed over in silence); when the discussion is supposed to begin, their supporters ostentatiously walk out, and the Opposition argue to empty benches; then when the moment for closing the discussion arrives, the Minister in charge gets up and says that the Government cannot accept any of the amendments proposed; the bell rings, the Government supporters troop back, and pass all the clauses unamended.  As an instance of this contemptible way of conducting the debate, it is sufficient to point to the fact already mentioned, that so vital a matter as the power of the English Parliament to tax Ireland was not even hinted at until nearly the end of the debates.