piety, which was not to be required of common Christians; they were spoken to a great multitude; they were spoken to warn all persons in that multitude that not one of them could become a Christian, unless he gave himself up to Christ body and soul.  Thus declaring that there is but one rule for all; a rule which the highest Christian can never go beyond; and which the lowest, if he would be a Christian at all, must make the foundation of his whole life.

Now take the words, either of the text or of the 26th verse, and is it possible to avoid seeing that, on the very lowest interpretation, they do insist upon a very high standard; that they do require a very entire and devoted obedience?  Is it possible for any one who believes what Christ has said, to rest contented, either for himself or for others, with that very low and very unchristian standard which he sees and knows to prevail generally in the world?  Is it possible for him not to wish, for himself and for all in whose welfare he is interested, that they may belong to the small minority in matters of principle and practice, rather than to the large majority?

And because he so wishes, one who endeavours to follow Christ sincerely can never be satisfied with the excuse that he acts and thinks quite as well as the mass of persons about him; it can never give him comfort, with regard to any judgment or practice, to be told, in common language, “Everybody thinks so; everybody does so.”  If, indeed, this expression “everybody” might be taken literally; if it were quite true, without any exception, that “everybody thought or did so;” then I grant that it would have a very great authority; so great that it would be almost a mark of madness to run counter to it.  For what all men, all without a single exception, were to agree in, must be some truth which the human mind could not reject without insanity,—­like the axioms of science, or some action which if we did not we could not live, as sleeping and eating; or if there be any moral point so universally agreed upon, then it must be something exceedingly general:  as, for instance, that truth is in itself to be preferred to falsehood; which to dispute would be monstrous.  But, once admit a single exception, and the infallible virtue of the rule ceases.  I can conceive one single good and wise man’s judgment and practice, requiring, at any rate, to be carefully attended to, and his reasons examined, although millions upon millions stood against him.  But go on with the number of exceptions, and bring the expression “everybody,” to its real meaning, which is only “most persons,” “the great majority of the world;” then the rule becomes of no virtue at all, but very often the contrary.  If in matters of morals many are on one side and some on the other, it is impossible to pronounce at once which are most likely to be right:  it depends on the sort of case on which the difference exists; for the victories of truth and of good are but partial.  It is not all truth that triumphs in the world, nor all good; but only truth and good up to a certain point.  Let them once pass this point, and their progress pauses.  Their followers, in the mass, cannot keep up with them thus far:  fewer and fewer are those who still press on in their company, till at last even these fail; and there is a perfection at which they are deserted by all men, and are in the presence of God and of Christ alone.