their authority for the interpretation of Scripture was undoubtedly the supreme government of the church, i.e. not the bishops, but the King and parliament.  But then this had respect not to the power of discerning truth, but to the right of publishing it, which is an wholly different question.  That an individual was not bound in foro conscientiae to admit the truth of any interpretation of Scripture which did not approve itself to his own mind, was no less the judgment of the Church of England than that if he publicly disputed the interpretation of the church, he might be punished as unruly and a despiser of government.  But then it should ever be remembered that the church, with the Reformers, was not the clergy.  And now that the right of publication is conceded by the church, it is quite just to say that the Church of England allows private judgment; and if that judgment differ from her own, she condemns not the act of judging at all, but the having come to a false conclusion.

It is urged that the act of I Elizabeth, c. 1, allows that to be heresy which the first four councils determined to be so.  This is true; but it also adjudges to be heresy whatever shall be hereafter declared to be so by “the high court of parliament, with the assent of the clergy in their convocation.”  The Church of England undoubtedly allowed the decisions of the first four councils, in matters of doctrine, to be valid, as it allowed the three creeds, because it decided that they were agreeable to Scripture; but the binding authority was that of the English Parliament, not of the councils of Nicaea or Constantinople.

As to the canon of 1571, which allows preachers to teach nothing as religious truth but what is agreeable to the Scriptures, “and which the catholic fathers and ancient bishops have collected from that very doctrine of Scripture,” it will be observed that it is merely negative, and does not sanction the teaching of the “catholic fathers and ancient bishops,” generally, or say that men shall teach what they taught; but that they shall not teach as matter of religious faith, a new deduction from Scripture of their own making, but such truths as had been actually deduced from Scripture before, namely, the great articles of the Christian faith.  Farther, the canons of 1571 are of no authority, not having received the royal assent.—­See Strype’s Life of Parker, p. 322, ed. 1711.]

It is invidiously described as maintaining “the sufficiency of private judgment.”  Now we maintain the sufficiency of private judgment in interpreting the Scriptures in no other sense than that in which every sane man maintains its sufficiency, in interpreting Thucydides or Aristotle; we mean, that, instead of deferring always to some one interpreter, as an idle boy follows implicitly the Latin version of his Greek lesson, the true method is to consult all[17] accessible authorities, and to avail ourselves of the assistance of all.  And we contend, that, by this process, as we discover, for the most part, the true meaning of Thucydides and Aristotle with undoubted certainty, so we may also discover, not, indeed, in every particular part or passage, but generally, the true meaning of the Holy Scriptures with no less certainty.