yet by the general suspicion of the world at this
day most common. The causes of it, which are in
the parties themselves, although you handle in the
beginning of the fifth book, yet here again they may
be touched: but the occasions of help and furtherance,
which by the Reformers have been yielded unto them,
are, as I conceive, two; namely, senseless preaching,
and disgracing of the Ministry: for how should
not men dare to impugn that, which neither by force
of reason, nor by authority of persons, is maintained?
But in the parties themselves these two causes I conceive
of Atheism: 1. More abundance of wit than
judgment, and of witty than judicious learning; whereby
they are more inclined to contradict any thing, than
willing to be informed of the truth. They are
not therefore men of sound learning for the most part,
but smatterers; neither is their kind of dispute so
much by force of argument, as by scoffing; which humour
of scoffing, and turning matters most serious into
merriment, is now become so common, as we are not
to marvel what the Prophet means by the seat of scorners,
nor what the Apostles, by foretelling of scorners
to come; for our own age hath verified their speech
unto us: which also may be an argument against
these scoffers and Atheists themselves, seeing it
hath been so many ages ago foretold, that such men
the latter days of the world should afford: which
could not be done by any other spirit, save that whereunto
things future and present are alike. And even
for the main question of the resurrection, whereat
they stick so mightily, was it not plainly foretold,
that men should in the latter times say, “Where
is the promise of his coming?” Against the creation,
the ark, and divers other points, exceptions are said
to be taken, the ground whereof is superfluity of wit,
without ground of learning and judgment. A second
cause of Atheism is sensuality, which maketh men desirous
to remove all stops and impediments of their wicked
life; among which because Religion is the chiefest,
so as neither in this life without shame they can persist
therein, nor—if that be true—without
torment in the life to come; they therefore whet their
wits to annihilate the joys of Heaven, wherein they
see—if any such be—they can have
no part, and likewise the pains of Hell, wherein their
portion must needs be very great. They labour
therefore, not that they may not deserve those pains,
but that, deserving them, there may be no such pains
to seize upon them. But what conceit can be imagined
more base, than that man should strive to persuade
himself even against the secret instinct, no doubt,
of his own mind, that his soul is as the soul of a
beast, mortal, and corruptible with the body?
Against which barbarous opinion their own Atheism
is a very strong argument. For, were not the soul
a nature separable from the body, how could it enter
into discourse of things merely spiritual, and nothing
at all pertaining to the body? Surely the soul
were not able to conceive any thing of Heaven, no not
so much as to dispute against Heaven, and against
God, if there were not in it somewhat heavenly, and
derived from God.