Having stated the case for resistance, it will serve us to consider some objections.  Many inquiring minds may be made happy by a clear view of the doctrine, till some clever opponent holds them up with remarks on prudence, possibly sensible, or remarks on revolutionists, most probably wild, with, perhaps, the authority of a great name, or unfailing refuge in the concrete.  It is curious that while often noticed how men, trying to evade a concrete issue, take refuge in the abstract, it is not noticed that men, trying to avoid acknowledging the truth of some principle, take refuge in the concrete.  A living and pressing difficulty, though transient, looms larger than any historical fact or coming danger.  Seeing this, we may restore confidence to a baffled mind, by helping it to distinguish the contingent from the permanent.  Thus, by disposing of objections, we make our ground secure.

II

To the name of prudence the most imprudent people frequently appeal.  Those whose one effort is to evade difficulties, who to cover their weakness plead patience, would be well advised to consider how men passionately in earnest, enraged by these evasions, pour their scorn on patience as a thing to shun.  The plea does not succeed; it only for the moment damages the prestige of a great name.  Patience is not a virtue of the weak but of the strong.  An objector says:  “Of course, all this is right in the abstract, but consider the frightful abuses in practice,” and some apt replies spring to mind.  Dr. Murray, writing on “Mental Reservation,” in his Essays, chiefly Theological, speaks thus:  “But it is no objection to any principle of morals to say that unscrupulous men will abuse it, or that, if publicly preached to such and such an audience or in such and such circumstances, it will lead to mischief.”  This is admirable, to which the objector can only give some helpless repetitions.  With Balmez, we reply:  “But in recommending prudence to the people let us not disguise it under false doctrines—­let us beware of calming the exasperation of misfortune by circulating errors subversive of all governments, of all society.” (European Civilisation, Chap. 55.) Of men who shrink from investigating such questions, Balmez wrote:  “I may be permitted to observe that their prudence is quite thrown away, that their foresight and precaution are of no avail.  Whether they investigate these questions or not, they are investigated, agitated and decided, in a manner that we must deplore.” (Ibid.  Chap. 54.) Take with this Turner on France under the old regime and the many and serious grievances of the people:  “The Church, whose duty it was to inculcate justice and forbearance, was identified, in the minds of the people, with the Monarchy which they feared and detested.” (History of Philosophy, Chap. 59.) The moral is that when injustice and evil are rampant, let us have no palliation, no weakness disguising itself as a virtue.  What we cannot at once resist, we can always repudiate.  To ignore these things is the worst form of imprudence—­an imprudence which we, for our part at least, take the occasion here heartily to disclaim.