purely defensive war.”  In none of his campaigns did he exhibit any desire to take advantage of the enemy by bold moves; his one idea seemed to be “defensive,” and in that he was a genius—­in retreat, his was a mastermind; in defense, masterly.  In the end it may have proven the better policy to have remained on the defensive.  But the quick, impulsive temperament of Beauregard was ever on the alert for some bold stroke or sudden attack upon the enemy’s weaker points.  His idea coincided with Longstreet’s in this particular, that the North, Kentucky, Tennessee, or Maryland should be the theatre of war and the battleground of the Confederacy.  General Lee, according to the ideas of one of his most trusted lieutenants, was more in accordance with the views of General Johnston, that is, “the South should fight a defensive war”—­and it was only when in the immediate presence of the enemy, or when he observed a weak point in his opponent, or a strategic move, that he could not resist the temptation to strike a blow.  In several of his great battles it is reported of Lee that he intended to await the attack of the enemy, but could not control his impatience when the enemy began to press him; then all the fire of his warlike nature came to the surface, and he sprang upon his adversary with the ferocity of a wild beast.  But Lee in battle was not the Lee in camp.

The middle of summer the two commanding Generals called President Davis to Fairfax Court House to enter a conference in regard to the projected invasion.  The plans were all carefully laid before him.  First a demonstration was to be made above Washington; then with the whole army cross below, strike Washington on the east, crush the enemy in their camps, march through Maryland, hoist the standard of revolt in that State, make a call for all Southern sympathizers to flock to their banners, and to overawe the North by this sudden onslaught.  But President Davis turned a deaf ear to all such overtures; pleaded the want of transportation and the necessary equipment for invasion.  It was the feeling of the South even at this late day that much could yet be done by diplomacy and mild measures; that a great body of the North could be won over by fears of a prolonged war; and the South did not wish to exasperate the more conservative element by any overt act.  We all naturally looked for peace; we fully expected the war would end during the fall and winter, and it was not too much to say that many of our leaders hugged this delusion to their breast.

While in camp here an incident occurred which showed that the men had not yet fully recognized the importance of military restraint and discipline.  It is well known that private broils or feuds of any kind are strictly forbidden by army regulations.  The French manner of settling disputes or vindicating personal honor according to code duello was not countenanced by our military laws; still the hot blood and fiery temper of the proud South Carolinians could brook